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A TRIBUTE TO JUDGE SIMON E. SOBELOFF
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CHAMBERS OF
THE CHIEF JUSTICE
Simon Sobeloff and I first met when he was Solicitor General
and I was Assistant Attorney General in the Eisenhower Adminis-
tration. We became, and remained, warm friends for twenty years
until his death. Thus, I worked with him when we were both
advocates for the United States and, after that, for a much longer
period while we were both Circuit Judges. As an advocate, he was
most persuasive, partly because of the engaging manner of his
presentation and partly because of his candor with courts. Both
of these qualities were buttressed by an unusually broad experi-
ence and undoubted learning in the law.
On the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, I have no
doubt that these splended qualities deriving from his experience,
his skill as an advocate, and personal charm enhanced his influ-
ence to the extent any one appellate judge can influence his col-
leagues. I am sure my personal experience with him which re-
flected his capacity to disagree agreeably was true in his relations
with his colleagues on the bench.
The essential gentleness of Simon Sobeloff's nature and tem-
perament in no way impaired his powers as an advocate, and I
believe it made him a better judge. His willingess to listen to
opposing points of view insured that, in turn, he would be heard
when he expressed his position. He contributed richly to the law,
and he will be sorely missed.
Warren E. Burger
%upreme vmrt of tle aniteb -5tatti
CHAMBERS OF
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS
I knew Simon E. Sobeloff only casually until he became
Solicitor General in 1954. From that time on, I came to know him
well, not only by his briefs and arguments, but also socially. His
civic interests were wide and varied, and he contributed greatly
as an active citizen. He had long been active in civil rights affairs:
working against school segregation, working for a federal anti-
lynching bill, working against censorship of the press, and work-
ing for the civil rights of all minorities. He had a wide range of
experience in the law-as private practitioner, as solicitor for
Baltimore City, as United States Attorney, as chairman of a
Commission on Administrative Reorganization of the State of
Maryland, as Chief Judge of the Maryland Court of Appeals, as
Solicitor General, and as a member of the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit from 1956 to the time of his death in 1973.
One of his first cases before the United States Supreme Court
was Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin,' argued in April 1954.
The Court held-to its sorrow I believe-that the Natural Gas
Act extended jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission to
regulation at the well head. Simon Sobeloff had argued that Con-
gress had designed the Act to leave that segment of regulation to
the State.
The theory that the end justifies the means subtly crept into
areas of our law. But Simon Sobeloff, like Brandeis before him,
stood firmly against that trend. He believed in due process for
everyone; he was a stickler for the proprieties of judicial proce-
dures; he was the symbol of integrity at a time in our national
life when sordid practices were accepted in high places. That is
why his strong and unequivocal stand on all issues of human
liberty and dignity and his pleas for the decencies of a civilized
society gave the nation a moral tone sorely needed.
The examples are numerous. I mention only one. In Peters
v. United States,' the Department of Justice argued that an em-
1. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
2. 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
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ployee could be discharged on the basis of disloyalty or as a secu-
rity measure without the right to meet his accuser and to cross-
examine him. The case was argued on April 19, 1955 at which
time Simon Sobeloff was Solicitor General. He had filed a memo-
randum in opposition to the grant of certiorari on the ground that
the Executive Order on which the dismissal of Peters was based
had been replaced. The brief on the merits, however, did not
carry Sobeloff's name. It was most unusual to find a brief from
the Department of Justice without the Solicitor General's name
on it. So, after the Court had disposed of the case, I asked him if
there was any reason why he did not sign the brief on the merits.
He said that he could not in good conscience take the position
that the right of confrontation could be denied a man "on trial,"
so to speak, for disloyalty and removal from office with all the
"stigma" which such action gave the citizen.
Simon Sobeloff grew up in a school of thought that placed
the proprieties of legal procedures high on the list. That was the
path he followed, no matter how despised the litigant might be.
Like Brandeis, he was meticulous in dispensing even-handed jus-
tice, no matter how offensive the accused. Simon Sobeloff be-
lieved not in "law and order" but in "constutitional law and
order." Our precepts of justice were not reserved for special dis-
play only on historic occasions involving the elite. They were
standards even more important at the level of a magistrate's
court than at the appellate level, for it is in the magistrate's court
that law has its greatest impact on the people.
He and his lovely wife, Irene, were both dedicated peo-
ple-dedicated to making their community a more decent, toler-
ant, and healthy place. The two of them left a tradition that will
always inspire those who follow.
1974]
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The short of the matter is that Simon Sobeloff was a wise and
perceptive human being, a warm friend, and a great judge. In
moments of depression, it is sometimes tempting to say "they
don't make them that way any more." But they do-and one of
the reasons they do is that Simon Sobeloff worked so long and
hard, in public and in private, to provide breathing space for the
human soul to grow.
I first met him in 1952 when he was just short of 60 years old.
I had known of him before as the Republican rival of Phil Perl-
man in Baltimore politics, and when a dinner was given to honor
Perlman, who was about to leave the office of Solicitor General,
Simon Sobeloff was the toastmaster. I was impressed. Three or
four weeks later, after the elections, he called to visit, and we
talked for several hours; I got to know him fast. Shortly after-
wards, I (and no doubt a number of others) urged him to put
himself forward for the Solicitor General's job, a post from which
he would almost surely receive from Eisenhower an appointment
to the Supreme Court. He agonized for a long time over the ques-
tion-he had been bitten early by the bug of public service and
only recently had achieved his lifetime ambition of becoming
Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland-but he finally
accepted the appointment as Solicitor General.
Those were not easy times for persons of principle in govern-
ment service. "Loyalty" and "security" programs were at their
height and lives were daily being shattered by an astonishing
collection of anonymous slander, gossip and misunderstanding,
disseminated against a nationwide background of fear. The Solic-
itor General had occasion to argue cases that he could not have
wanted to win.' But Simon took on the job with the firm convic-
tion that his primary task was "to reconcile legality with decency
1. E.g., Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956), involving a 40-year resident of the United
States who was being deported because of membership in the Communist Party during
the 1930's and undisclosed "confidential information." The order of deportation was up-
held, 5-4, but the Solicitor General's brief suggests that the office might not have been
upset by a contrary result. See Brief for Respondent, No. 503, October Term, 1955, at 4-
TRIBUTE TO SIMON E. SOBELOFF
and justice,"2 and confidence that disagreements could be worked
out by a process of reasonable accommodation.
At times that confidence was sorely tried. John Peters3 was
a professor of medicine at Yale who in the early 1950's was serving
as a consultant to the Public Health Service, coming to Washing-
ton from four to ten days a year at the call of the Surgeon General
to give advice regarding proposed federal grants. Unspecified
"derogatory information" caused several formal investigations of
his "loyalty" to be made from 1949 through 1952; each time he
received a clean bill of health. Then in 1953, not long before his
term as consultant was to expire, the matter was reopened by yet
another body, the "Loyalty Review Board." That Board, solely on
the basis of information that was never disclosed to Dr. Peters
and which came from "informants" whose identities were not all
known even to the Board, decided that there was a "reasonable
doubt" of his "loyalty" and sought to bar him from all federal
service for a period of three years. Dr. Peters sued to clear his
name and lost in both the district court and the court of appeals.
The Supreme Court agreed to review the case, which meant that
Simon, as Solicitor General, would have to defend the Govern-
ment's position. The case was widely publicized as the critical
test of the Government's loyalty-security programs. Simon was
terribly disturbed by the treatment Dr. Peters had received. At
first, however, he was confident that, as Solicitor General, he
could work out a decent compromise, so that the case would be
dismissed. But the officials responsible for administering the pro-
grams refused to compromise. Then Simon decided to take a
dramatic and unusual step-he would refuse to sign the Govern-
ment's brief or to argue its case in the Supreme Court.
I agreed with Simon that the Government's position in the
Peters case was indefensible and so did some of his other friends.
He knew of our strong feelings on the issue and of our intense
admiration for Judge Edgerton's dissent in the case of Dorothy
Bailey4 which involved similar problems of due process in deter-
mining the loyalty of government employees. Yet the conse-
quences of his action unsettled me. He was, after all, cutting off
a likely appointment to the Supreme Court. I wanted to be sure
he felt no pressure from his friends to take such a serious step. I
2. Sobeloff, The Law Business of the United States, 34 Oa. L. REv. 145, 148 (1955)
[hereinafter cited as The Law Business of the United States].
3. Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 341 (1955).
4. Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (Edgerton, J., dissenting),
aff'd, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
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visited him that evening, and he listened patiently while I voiced
my concerns. Then he smiled. "No, I do not take this step because
I want to be able to live with my friends," he said simply. "I do
it because I have to be able to live with myself."'
Simon set high standards for himself and never stopped
trying to meet them, yet he had, at the same time, a refreshing
humility and a capacity to understand the problems of others. He
was fond of describing his position as a judge on the court of
appeals as a "pebble ground between two millstones"-the dis-
trict courts below and the Supreme Court above-and he rarely
neglected to add that, as a district court judge once remarked to
him, "the millstones may find the pebble a bit abrasive at times."
Recognition of problems, however, never seemed to him an excuse
for abdication. He would speak sadly of the "flood" of "utterly
groundless" habeas corpus petitions from prisoners-and then
add that "the discovery and correction of an occasional miscar-
riage of justice makes the entire labor worthwhile."' He had no
illusions that answers would be easy to find: "I don't believe in
magic." 7 Although he knew that "[m]any may hope in the inter-
est of certainty that . . . all problems will be finally solved," in
his view, "for the sake of justice, the quest should continue indefi-
nitely. '
Simon's hallmarks were learning and wisdom, tempered by
a tremendous feeling for people. He once told me of a day that
he sat, as Solicitor General, listening to the Supreme Court de-
liver an opinion upholding the deportation of a Mexican who had
resided legally in the United States since 1918 with an American
wife and four children. The man had been acted against because
he had been a member of the Communist Party in California from
1944 to 1946, at a time when the Party was regularly running
candidates for state office in California elections.' Felix Frank-
furter delivered the Court's opinion; he went over every point at
some length, and when he was finished, Simon sat in his chair
with the feeling that harsh as the result might be, there was just
no way out. Then, Hugo Black leaned forward in his chair and
looked out over the courtroom to deliver his dissent. "You know,"
5. He had made a similar point earlier in a speech delivered in 1954, referring to
"instances ... where confession of error is not only in order but is a moral necessity."
The Law Business of the United States, supra note 2, at 149.
6. Sobeloff, Address, 8 BROOKLYN BARRISTER 93, 99, 101 (1958).
7. Symposium, Appellate Review of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 249, 270 (1962).
8. Sobeloff, Federalism and Individual Liberties - Can We Have Both?, 1965
WASH. U.L.Q. 296, 310.
9. The case is Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
[VOL. XXXIV
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he began and then slowly continued with measured emphasis, "I
just don't think we mean to do people this way." Simon never
forgot that, and he would have taken strong issue with Felix
Frankfurter's remarks some years later that the first, second and
third requirements for a judge were disinterestedness, disinteres-
tedness, and disinterestedness." His opinions display the highest
order of legal craftsmanship (and a truly remarkable ability to
clarify tangled questions) fleshed out with genuine concern for
others and a hearty degree of common sense." He was sensitive
to the limits of appellate courts, recognizing that review is never
an adequate substitute for doing things right in the first instance,
and he knew as well that denunciation and affirmance are never
a substitute for undoing the wrong that has been done.'2
He was regularly well ahead of his times. On one matter
particularly close to my heart, I can say that he early got the point
of Durham v. United States. 3 While many commentators were
arguing as if the opinion were designed simply to change the
standard to be given a jury asked to decide if a defendant was
criminally responsible for his actions, Simon realized that its
major purpose was to broaden the range of information available
to jurors asked to decide the question. 4 And we still haven't
caught up with his prescient efforts, for almost two decades, to
bring fairness and rationality into the process of sentencing per-
sons convicted of crime.'"
Someone once said that there are two kinds of paymasters:
one kind looks through the rulebook until he finds the rule saying
you don't get the money that's coming to you, and the other kind
looks through until he finds the rule that says you can have what
10. Frankfurter, Judge Henry W. Edgerton, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 162 (1957).
11. E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1237-48 (4th Cir. 1970) (Sobeloff,
J., concurring and dissenting); Landman v. Peyton, 370 F. 2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966); Lank-
ford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966); Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d
60 (4th Cir. 1965).
12. Compare Howard v. Smyth, 365 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1966) with The Law Business
of the United States, supra note 2, at 150.
13. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
14. Sobeloff, Book Review, 42 A.B.A.J. 152 (1956). Compare Sobeloff, From Mc-
Naghten to Durham, and Beyond - A Discussion of Insanity and the Criminal Law, 15
MD. L. REv. 93, 101-03, 105-07 (1955) with United States v. Eichberg, 439 F.2d 620, 625
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring), and United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969,
1033-34 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
15. Sobeloff, A Recommendation for Appellate Review of Criminal Sentences, 21
BROOKLYN L. REV. 2 (1954); Sobeloff, The Sentence of the Court: Should There Be Appel-
late Review?, 41 A.B.A.J. 13 (1955); Symposium, Appellate Review of Sentences, 32
F.R.D. 249, 264-75 (1962); American Bar Association, Standards Relating to Appellate
Review of Sentences (Approved Draft, 1968).
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you need even if you don't really deserve it. Simon Sobeloff would
have been the second kind; I can't imagine a better model for a
judge, or for a human being.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
ABEL J. MERRILL*
The bench, bar and citizens of the State of Maryland are
wealthier today because their lives have been enriched by Simon
E. Sobeloff, a giant who lived in their midst. In these turbulent
times, it is fitting to reflect upon the life and career of this man
whose distinguished service to the community set standards to
which we might aspire. A brief sketch of the Judge's biographical
background and a listing of the offices that he held furnish objec-
tive evidence of his outstanding service and record of accomplish-
ments.
Simon E. Sobeloff was born on December 3, 1894, in east
Baltimore to immigrant parents. At age twelve, he started his
career in the law as an office boy, earning a salary of $1.50 per
week, in the law office of William F. Broening. Two years later,
upon the appointment by Representative John Kronmiller of Bal-
timore City, he entered the federal service as a pageboy in the
House of Representatives.
Five years later, Simon Sobeloff began the formal study of
law at the University of Maryland School of Law where he com-
piled an outstanding academic record. While attending law
school, he became law clerk and secretary to Morris Ames Soper,
then Chief Judge of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City. Hav-
ing received one of the highest marks on the Bar examination, he
was admitted to the Bar in 1914, a year before earning his law
degree, a practice which was then permissible.
After entering the practice of law, Mr. Sobeloff was ap-
pointed by Mayor Broening as an Assistant Baltimore City Solici-
tor. He served in that office from 1919 until 1923 when he resumed
the private practice of law. Mr. Sobeloff returned to public serv-
ice in 1927 when he accepted an appointment as Deputy City
Solicitor.
In February, 1931, Mr. Sobeloff, upon the recommendation
of Senator Phillips Lee Goldsborough, was nominated by Presi-
dent Herbert Hoover as United States Attorney for the District
of Maryland. The nomination was confirmed with the strong sup-
port of then United States District Judge Morris Ames Soper,
notwithstanding the questionable objection of another federal
district judge. Mr. Sobeloff's term as United States Attorney was
* B.A., 1959, Colgate University; LL.B., 1964, University of Maryland; Law Clerk
to Judge Sobeloff, 1963-64; President, Merrill & Lilly, P.A., Annapolis, Maryland.
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marked by vigorous enforcement of the prohibition laws with
which he was not in full sympathy. In March, 1934, he resigned
from that office and returned to the private practice of law which
he continued until 1943.
In that year, the Mayor of Baltimore City, Theodore R.
McKeldin, appointed Mr. Sobeloff as City Solicitor. Mr. Sobeloff
served in this post until 1947 when Mr. McKeldin, who had since
been elected Governor of Maryland, appointed him chairman of
an unpaid state commission, the "Little Hoover Commission," to
review the administrative structure of the Maryland government.
After nine months service as commission chairman, Mr. Sobeloff
again resumed the private practice of law.
He was appointed Chief Judge of the Maryland Court of
Appeals by Governor McKeldin, and upon taking office on De-
cember 16, 1952, Judge Sobeloff became the first member of his
faith to sit on that court. His service as Chief Judge of the Mary-
land Court of Appeals continued until his resignation in 1954
when President Dwight D. Eisenhower nominated him to be the
Solicitor General of the United States.
During his tenure as Solicitor General, beginning February
25, 1954, Judge Sobeloff presented the government's arguments
on implementation' of the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.
Board of Education,2 outlawing segregation in public schools.
Also while Solicitor General, the Judge, as a matter of conscience
and despite the wishes of his superiors, refused to sign or argue
the government's brief in Peters v. Hobby3 because he believed
that the government's position violated a fundamental principle
of liberty.
President Eisenhower nominated Judge Sobeloff in July,
1955, to become a member of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit. After his confirmation by the Senate was
delayed for a year by Southern Senators concerned over his possi-
ble judicial attitude towards school segregation, Judge Sobeloff
was sworn in as a member of that court on July 19, 1956, and
became chief judge by seniority on March 17, 1958. Judge Sobel-
off served as chief judge until December, 1964, when he attained
the mandatory retirement age of seventy. He relinquished the
chief judgeship to become a senior circuit judge, remaining an
active judge until his death on July 11, 1973.
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). For a synopsis of the government's
brief see 99 L. Ed. 1083, 1099 (1955).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
[VOL. XXXIV
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A simple listing of even so distinguished a record cannot,
however, begin to give a full measure of the man. Judge Sobeloff
was described on many occasions by Theodore R. McKeldin as a
"champion of the underdog." Reference to several opinions
crafted by the Judge may illustrate why the appellation was so
richly deserved.
On numerous occasions, the fourth circuit was called upon
to review a hearing examiner's administrative denial of a worker's
claim to social security disability benefits. Many such cases origi-
nated in the economically hard-pressed areas of West Virginia
and usually involved coal miners. For reasons best left to specula-
tion, few claimants in such cases were found by the hearing exam-
iner to be entitled to disability benefits. Generally, the stated
ground for denial was that the worker had not produced legally
sufficient evidence to meet the statutory requirement that he was
"unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity" by reason
of his disability.'
A typical case was that of Winston P. Cyrus,5 a forty-nine
year old West Virginian with a fourth grade education and record
of employment at manual labor. After his ruptured discs required
two spinal laminectomies and fusions, with the risk that a third
operation would cause paralysis, he could neither bend nor stand
all day and suffered from persistent pain. Cyrus had been out of
work for almost two years, unable to find a job which he could
perform. The social security examiner concluded, based upon a
witness' reference to an occupational manual, that Cyrus "was
capable of performing functions of light or sedentary occupations
prevailing in the economy," including "[keeper] in a dog ken-
nel" and "assembler in a manufacturing industry."' The exam-
iner denied the claim.
In an opinion sustaining the district court's reversal of the
examiner, Judge Sobeloff wrote for the fourth circuit:
The existence of jobs in a compilation running the full gamut
from astronaut to zookeeper, available somewhere in the na-
tional economy, from Anchorage, Alaska, to Zapata, Texas,
is of little relevance. . . .[T]here must be evidence to show
4. The statutory definition of disability is:
inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than 12 months . . ..
42 U.S.C. §§ 416 (i)(1)(A), 423 (d)(1)(A) (1970).
5. Cyrus v. Celebrezze, 341 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1965).
6. Id. at 195.
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the reasonable availability of jobs which this particular
claimant is capable of performing.7
In a similar case, the Judge wrote:
[I]t would be a wholly unrealistic application of the
statutory standards to expect an illiterate person of the
claimant's age whose only previous work experience was at
hard manual labor in the coal mines and elsewhere and who
was suffering under the cumulative proven hardship of these
multiple disabilities to obtain, much less perform, any sub-
stantial employment.8
In addition to his concern for the underdog, Judge Sobeloff,
throughout his life, was vigorous in his devotion to human free-
dom and concern for the rights and privileges of the individual.
The Judge fully recognized, however, that his unyielding applica-
tion of the rule of law without regard to person, particularly with
respect to the criminally accused, was not universally accepted.
He, therefore, took pains to emphasize the critical importance to
society as a whole of requiring all branches of government to
respect the Bill of Rights. In a 1962 speech at the University of
Oregon, he stated:
The constitutional protections asserted by a criminal
today may become the necessary defense tomorrow of an
honest and responsible man. If we tolerate usages destructive
of freedom, if we put men in fear so that they dare not exer-
cise the first prerogatives of free men, it is certain that the
victims will only be tinder for the spreading fire. These sacri-
ficial lambs may richly deserve their fate, but the circle
tends to widen and include others indiscriminately.'
Judge Sobeloff may have had these thoughts in mind during
his review of a federal district court's denial of a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus in Davis v. North Carolina.o Davis was arrested
after a brutal rape-murder, held incommunicado in a small room
in a city jail for sixteen days, isolated from counsel, friends and
family, questioned daily, inadequately fed, and not informed of
7. Id. at 196-97.
8. Lackey v. Celebrezze, 349 F.2d 76, 79-80 (4th Cir. 1965).
9. Address by Judge Sobeloff, University of Oregon, Oct. 15, 1962, in Sobeloff,
Liberty: Spiritual Glory of the Bill of Rights, Baltimore Sun, July 14, 1973, § A, at 18,
col. 4.
10. 310 F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1962). The court, in an opinion by Chief Judge Sobeloff,
held that the denial by the district court, 196 F. Supp. 488 (E.D.N.C. 1961), without a
hearing, was improper and reversed and remanded for a hearing.
[VOL. XXXIV
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his right to counsel. On the sixteenth day, after a police lieuten-
ant led him in "prayer," Davis confessed.. Following the admis-
sion of the confession into evidence, Davis was convicted and
sentenced to death. The conviction had received judicial approval
throughout all levels of the state court system and by the federal
district court, both before and after a hearing on the petition,
when the case came before the fourth circuit for the second time."
The issue before the court was whether the confession passed
constitutional muster as being voluntary.
Dissenting from all prior adjudications and the majority of
his court that the confession was voluntary, Judge Sobeloff, after
an incisive and detailed analysis of the case, concluded that the
overwhelming evidence showed the confession to have been the
involuntary product of coercion. The Supreme Court adopted
Judge Sobeloff's opinion sub silentio and reversed Davis' convic-
tion." This was but one of the many instances in which Judge
Sobeloff's fourth circuit dissent became the basis for a Supreme
Court majority opinion.
A more personal example may further explain Judge Sobel-
off's point of view. After a particular case had been argued before
the court, the panel of judges had reached tentative agreement
on its disposition, and the case had been assigned to Judge Sobel-
off for the preparation of the court's written opinion, it was the
Judge's practice to engage in vigorous discourse with his law
clerks in an effort to fashion a sound and persuasive legal theory
in support of the agreed result. It was not uncommon during such
interchanges for a sympathetic but frustrated law clerk to suggest
that, in view of the lack of an appropriate precedent, the desired
result, giving redress to an individual whose rights had been de-
nied by a new variant of illegal government action, could not be
justified. After the Judge's gentle but predictable rejection of
such an opinion, upon being asked by the clerk to identify the
legal theory on which the Judge would bottom the result, the
Judge would, without hesitation, proffer his favorite theory of
"t'aint fair."
Finally, no reference to Judge Sobeloff's writings or career
would be complete without recognition of his sparkling wit and
his conviction that even weighty matters need not be dealt with
in a droll fashion. Because exploration of the ponderous and intri-
11. Davis v. North Carolina, 339 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1964) (en banc). Denial of the
petition after a hearing on remand, 221 F. Supp. 494 (E.D.N.C. 1963), was affirmed over
the dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Sobeloff.
12. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966).
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cate Internal Revenue Code was definitely not the Judge's favor-
ite judicial pursuit, it is significant that perhaps the finest exam-
ple of this aspect of the Judge appears in "Diamond Jim," a tax
case. "a
Simmons, a sportfisherman, had received a $25,000 cash
prize from a brewer in its annual Fishing Derby for catching
"Diamond Jim III," a fish with an identification tag. Simmons
contended that the $25,000 was excludable from his gross income
on the ground that it was a "prize. . .made primarily in recogni-
tion of. . .civic achievement."' 4 Judge Sobeloff's opinion began
with the observation that: "Diamond Jim III, a rock fish, was one
of the millions of his species swimming in the Chesapeake Bay,
but he was a very special fish, and he occasions some nice legal
questions."' 5 The Judge, in his own style, then dealt with the
taxpayer's contention:
Viewing the facts most favorably to the taxpayer, we
hold that he was not rewarded for a civic achievement,
properly interpreted. There was nothing meritorious in a
civic sense in catching this rock fish. Simmons was not even
rewarded for an extraordinary display of skill, if that could
be considered a civic achievement, for catching Diamond
Jim III was essentially a matter of luck. The case might be
different if, for example, Simmons had at considerable risk
to himself captured and destroyed a killer whale terrorizing
the Maryland seashore. That could have been regarded as a
genuine civic achievement. But catching this fish cannot
reasonably be so denominated, for the only community inter-
est in the event was one of idle curiosity. Innumerable are
the rhapsodies uttered in praise of the delights and virtues
of the piscatorial pastime, but never to our knowledge has it
been seriously called a civic enterprise. The character of this
fortuitous event is not raised to a civic level by being linked
to an advertising campaign aimed at selling beer. Far from
resembling a Nobel or Pulitzer prize-winner, Mr. Simmons
fits naturally in the less-favored classification the legislators
reserved for beneficiaries of "giveaway programs."16
13. Simmons v. United States, 308 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1962).
14. The Internal Revenue Code provides: "Gross income does not include amounts
received as prizes and awards made primarily in recognition of religious, charitable, scien-
tific, educational, artistic, literary, or civic achievement. ... INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§ 74 (b).
15. 308 F.2d at 161.
16. Id. at 163-64.
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In conclusion, our very special friend and mentor has left an
indelible impression upon all who came in contact with him, and
he is deeply missed.
JUDGE SOBELOFF'S PUBLIC SCHOOL RACE
DECISIONS*
SANFORD JAY ROSEN**
An invitation to review Simon Sobeloff's public school race
decisions is an invitation to review the development of public
schools race relations law since the Supreme Court's first decision
in Brown v. Board of Education.' His involvement with the sub-
ject actually preceded his ascension to the federal bench. While
Solicitor General of the United States, appointed by President
Eisenhower, Judge Sobeloff participated in the argument before
the Supreme Court that led to the second decision in Brown v.
Board of Education,' the 1955 decision on school desegregation
remedy.
In Brown I, the Supreme Court ruled that public school seg-
regation of blacks from whites, pursuant to the state segregation
statutes that flourished in the South following the Reconstruction
Period, offended the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.3 More than any other single event, Brown I signaled
*In preparing this article, I have resisted the temptation to treat Judge Sobeloff's
other race relations decisions. Many of these decisions were as important to the develop-
ment of race relations law as were his school decisions. A few, therefore, are entitled to
brief mention. His decision in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. 322 F.2d 959
(4th Cir. 1963) (en banc), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964), enlarged the concept of
"governmental action" under the fifth and fourteenth amendments and provided the
judicial underpinnings for Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d,
2000d-1 (1970), prohibiting invidious discrimination by federal government contractors
and grantees. Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966) (en banc), resulted from
a nineteen day Baltimore police rampage through the black ghetto in search of two alleged
"cop killers." For a unanimous court, Judge Sobeloff ordered that the district court enter
a "decree enjoining the Police Department from conducting a search of any private house
to effect the arrest of any person not known to reside therein, whether with or without an
arrest warrant, where the belief that the person is on the premises is based only on an
anonymous tip and hence without probable cause." Id. at 206. Thus, Judge Sobeloff
attempted to establish an alternative to the exclusionary rule for the enforcement of the
fourth amendment right to be safe from unreasonable searches and seizures. In Jenkins
v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970), he treated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a tort statute
and ruled that a state police officer's gross or culpable negligence in shooting an eighteen-
year-old black youth was a constitutional violation and supported a damage action under
that statute.
**A.B., 1959, Cornell University; LL.B., 1962 Yale University; Law Clerk to Judge
Sobeloff, 1962-63; Legal Director, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc.; Author's note: The views expressed are those of the author and are not to be
attributed to the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Brown Il.
2. 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Brown II].
3. In the companion case, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the federal govern-
ment's racial segregation within the public schools of the District of Columbia was de-
clared to violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
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the start of America's race to catch up with itself and to practice
what it preached. In Brown II, alas, the Supreme Court allowed
the race to begin at a snail's pace. Immediate and complete de-
segregation of the defendant school districts was not compelled.
The five separate cases comprising Brown II were remanded to
the trial courts; "school authorities" were declared to "have the
primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving
[the] problems" relating to desegregation; and the trial courts
were directed to balance competing equities in evaluating school
authorities' actions and to require only "that the defendants
make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance"
with Brown I.' Thus, the five cases were remanded to the trial
courts to take such steps "consistent with this opinion as are
necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially
nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to
these cases."5
Perhaps not in all of its detail, but certainly in its thrust, the
Brown II opinion conformed to the position Solicitor General So-
beloff had taken before the Supreme Court on behalf of the
United States.6 Not too long after that decision, however, he re-
linquished his position as the nation's chief litigator and donned
judicial robes.'
In becoming a member of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, he joined a federal appellate court whose
jurisdiction extended over three former confederate states-
Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina-and two border
states-Maryland and West Virginia. The public schools of
each of these states were rigidly segregated pursuant to state
statute. Only the Fifth Circuit had jurisdiction over more segre-
gationist states and was to have a heavier case load of school
segregation cases.8
Upon becoming a federal judge, Simon Sobeloff found him-
self in a critical position with respect to appellate review of the
workings of the public school desegregation machinery which he,
as an advocate, had helped to design. Shortly after he joined the
court, his position became even more influential in the enforce-
4. 349 U.S. at 299-300.
5. Id. at 301 (emphasis added).
6. See 99 L.Ed. 1083, 1099 (1955) for a summary of the brief for the United States
in Brown H.
7. Judge Sobeloff joined the Fourth Circuit on July 20, 1956.
8. See generally Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation: Progress and
Prospects, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 193 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Bickel].
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ment of the Brown decisions. In 1958, he became Chief Judge of
the Fourth Circuit' and remained in that post until attaining the
mandatory retirement age of seventy in 1965. Judge Sobeloff con-
tinued as an active member of the court until he accepted senior
judge status in 1971. By then he had come to occupy a remarkably
advanced position on public school race issues, and he had con-
tributed significantly to the development of the law and philoso-
phy of the subject.
Although technically only primus inter pares, Judge Sobeloff
was able to accomplish a great deal as the "Chief' during this
significant period in the development of race relations law. He
was both a strong judge and strong chief judge. The impact that
his personality, intellect and morality had on his contribution to
the development of the law should not be discounted. In the role
of chief judge, his natural talents found a productive outlet. It
was his duty to manage the court: to administer its docket, estab-
lish hearing panels and assign the drafting of opinions when he
was on the prevailing side. He embraced these duties and used
them, where proper, to develop the law along the lines he thought
appropriate.
Judge Sobeloff employed a firm and healthy pragmatism as
well as an acutely attuned "sense of injustice."' 10 Hence, not be-
cause of any need for self-apology but because he thought at the
time that Brown II was necessary, he never doubted that he and
the Supreme Court had taken the right approach in that decision.
I think he would not have joined, therefore, in Justice Black's
statement in 1968, that the "all deliberate speed" formula "de-
layed the process of outlawing segregation" and that it would
have been preferable to treat Brown I "as an ordinary lawsuit and
enforce that judgment on the counties it affected that minute."'"
Judge Sobeloff, however, never doubted that Brown II was only
an expedient, designed to allow the country a brief period to
adjust before pressing more rapidly for a complete end to segrega-
tion and racism in our public life.'2
Judge Sobeloff's school decisions can be divided into three
stages. During the initial period, which extended through his first
9. Upon Chief Judge John J. Parker's death on March 17, 1958, Judge Sobeloff
became the chief judge.
10. See E. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE: AN ANTHROPOCENTRIC VIEW OF LAW (1949).
11. Transcript of Justice Black and the Bill of Rights, CBS News Special 5 (Dec. 3,
1968).
12. See, e.g., Brunson v. Board of Trustees of School Dist. No. 1 of Clarendon
County, 429 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1970) (en banc) (Sobeloff and Winter, JJ., concurring).
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two years as chief judge, he was familiarizing himself with the
court and his new role. He was not overly assertive. His predeces-
sor, Chief Judge John J. Parker was, after all, both a compelling
force and a difficult act to follow." Also, Judge Sobeloff regarded
Judge Morris A. Soper, who continued as a member of the court
until 1963, as his mentor. 4 During this initial period, the South
was developing its arsenal of techniques to avoid compliance with
Brown I, and the inferior federal courts were working out the
meaning of "all deliberate speed" and making unrealistic distinc-
tions between desegregation and integration. 5
The second period extended to the end of his tenure as chief
judge in 1965. Judge Sobeloff asserted his leadership and continu-
ously moved his court, as best he could, away from the "all delib-
erate speed" approach toward insistence upon immediate and
complete compliance with both the letter and the spirit of Brown
I. He understood that the principle of Brown I required, at the
very least, the dismantling, "root and branch,"'" of the statutory
biracial or dual school systems of the South. Massive resistance
in the South crumbled during this period 7 as Congress legislated
equal treatment for racial and ethnic minorities."
The third stage began shortly before Richard Nixon's elec-
tion to the presidency in 1968. Judge Sobeloff, as he pressed not
merely for desegregation but for full and complete integration of
our public schools and for the cleansing of out society's racism,
found himself isolated from a majority of his colleagues, but not
from a majority of the Supreme Court. This was the period of the
riots, white backlash and a loss of national spirit. Nevertheless,
he never lost hope, and he continued to press, perhaps even
harder, for equality of treatment.
Reluctantly, Judge Sobeloff retired to senior judge status in
13. See In Memoriam Honorable John Johnston Parker: 1885-1958, Proceedings in
the United States Court of Appeals, 253 F.2d 5 (4th Cir. 1958).
14. See In Memoriam Honorable Morris Ames Soper, Response by Hon. Simon E.
Sobeloff, Chief Judge United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 326 F.2d 25
(4th Cir. 1973).
15. See Bickel, supra note 8, at 203-12.
16. Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court in Green v. County School Bd. of
New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968), rev'g 382 F.2d 338 (4th Cir. 1967) (en banc),
relied heavily on Judge Sobeloff's special concurring opinion in Bowman v. County School
Bd. of Charles City County, 382 F.2d 326, 330-38 (4th Cir. 1967) (en banc). Green and
Bowman were decided by the Fourth Circuit on the same day and presented questions
that were "substantially the same." 382 F.2d at 339.
17. See generally Bickel, supra note 8.
18. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252 (July 2, 1964), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d,
2000d-1 (1970).
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1971. He continued his work as a judge, carrying as heavy a load
of cases as most active members of the court. All of the court's
important school cases, however, were now being heard en banc,
and a senior judge could not participate unless he had been a
member of the original panel that heard the case. 9 Hence, Judge
Sobeloff authored his last school opinion more than two years
before he died. 0
WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED
During his first several years on the court, Judge Sobeloff
participated in a number of important school cases in which per
curiam opinions were issued.2' He signed no opinions for the
court, and, indeed, few of the early Fourth Circuit school opinions
were signed.2 2 This use of per curiam opinions is partially ex-
plained by the silence of the Supreme Court. The Court had made
no new pronouncements about school desegregation, except to
indicate in Cooper v. Aaron2 3 that community opposition to de-
segregation orders could not delay enforcement of court orders
implementing the "all deliberate speed" formula.24 No further
clarification of the Brown mandate was provided until the mid-
1960's, and no time schedule was set for desegregation.
With this lack of direction from the Supreme Court, it is not
surprising that most Fourth Circuit school opinions were
19. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1970).
20. 442 F.2d at 593, separate concurring and dissenting opinion of Sobeloff and
Winter, JJ., to United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 442 F.2d 575 (4th Cir.
1971) (en banc), rev'd, 407 U.S. 484 (1972), and Turner v. Littleton-Lake Gaston School
Dist., 442 F.2d 584 (4th Cir. 1971) (en banc). Judges Sobeloff and Winter dissented from
the reversal in Scotland Neck and concurred in the affirmance of Littleton-Lake Gaston.
Judge Sobeloff did not participate in the companion case of Wright v. Council of City of
Emporia, 442 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1971) (en banc), although his opinion "necessarily
reflect[ed] on that decision as well .... "Id. at 593.
21. E.g., Farley v. Turner, 281 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1960); Jones v. School Bd. of
Alexandria, 278 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1960); Covington v. Edwards, 264 F.2d 780 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 840 (1959); Hamm v. County School Bd. of Arlington County, 264
F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1959); Hamm v. County School Bd. of Arlington County, 263 F.2d 226
(4th Cir. 1959); Board of Educ. of St. Mary's County v. Groves, 261 F.2d 527 (4th Cir.
1958); School Bd. of Norfolk v. Beckett, 260 F.2d 18 (4th Cir. 1958); School Bd. of Warren
County v. Kilby, 259 F.2d 497 (4th Cir. 1958); County School Bd. of Arlington County v.
Thompson, 252 F.2d 929 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 958 (1958); School Bd. of City
of Newport News v. Atkins, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1957).
22. See Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956) (Parker, C.J.), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 910 (1957); School Bd. of Charlottesville v. Allen, 240 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1956)
(Parker, C.J.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957); Duckworth v. James, 267 F.2d 224 (4th
Cir.) (Soper, J.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 835 (1959).
23. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
24. Id. See School Bd. of Norfolk v. Beckett, 260 F.2d 18 (4th Cir. 1958) (per cur-
iam).
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anonymous and were characterized by caution and calls for
voluntarism. For example, following Judge Parker's three-judge
district court decision in Briggs v. Elliott,25 the court continued
to adhere to the strained view that the fourteenth amendment
does not require the mixing of the races in public schools but
merely prohibits their separation on the basis of race or color.2"
It was the Fourth Circuit's position that the Constitution requires
desegregation not integration.
During this period, Judge Sobeloff joined in the Fourth Cir-
cuit's decision in Carson v. Warlick," sustaining state pupil
placement laws as facially constitutional. These laws provided
that each child applying for admission to the public schools of a
given school district was individually enrolled in a school desig-
nated by the school board. Theoretically, placement was neither
controlled by predetermined attendance zones nor by any other
en masse enrollment system. Each child's application and enroll-
ment were considered separately. Carson provided that when a
child was denied placement in the school of his or her choice, a
likely event when a black child selected an all white school, the
state administrative and judicial remedies provided by such
pupil placement laws had to be exhausted prior to the filing of a
federal court desegregation lawsuit 8 unless exhaustion could be
shown to be futile.29 Further, dictum in Carson, indicating that
full class relief was not available in school cases, was adopted in
a subsequent holding.'" Thus, plaintiffs were denied prompt indi-
vidual relief and were unable to secure injunctions providing for
system-wide class relief.
The cases of this period primarily involved freeing school
boards from the effects of state-wide massive resistance laws,
such as the Virginia school closing laws which closed all public
schools subject to federal court desegregation orders, and, once
freed, giving the school boards an opportunity to find a solution
gradually and peacefully." The other school appeals heard by the
25. 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
26. School Bd. of Newport News v. Atkins, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1957) (per curiam);
Allen v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 249 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1957) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 953 (1958).
27. 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956).
28. E.g., Covington v. Edwards, 264 F.2d 780 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 840 (1959).
29. E.g., Farley v. Turner, 281 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1960) (per curiam); School Bd. of
Newport News v. Atkins, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855
(1957).
30. Jeffers v. Whitley, 309 F.2d 621 (4th Cir. 1962).
31. E.g., Jones v. School Bd. of Alexandria, 278 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1960) (per curiam);
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Fourth Circuit generally concerned the placement of a token
handful of black pupils in formerly all-white schools. Unless stays
were granted on appeal for very short periods of time, based on
allegations of administrative need and upon assurance of speedy
compliance thereafter,32 district court orders requiring such
placement were invariably affirmed.3 For example, even though
a school board's gradual plan for desegregation previously had
been adjudged constitutionally acceptable, a later district court
order requiring integration of an additional black child was up-
held. 31 In another case, a lower court order transferring four black
pupils to a previously all white school was sustained on appeal
despite the school authorities' claim that the children in question
had failed to pass an adaptability test.35 On the other hand, the
court sustained a decision by the same district judge, refusing to
order the transfer of five black children to a previously all white
school, on the ground that the School Board had not been shown
to have unequally applied the facially valid criteria of residency
and academic preparedness. 36
While we may speculate that Judge Sobeloff authored sev-
eral of the per curiam opinions delivered by the panels on which
he sat, especially after he became chief judge, the first school
desegregation opinion actually signed by Judge Sobeloff was ren-
dered on January 30, 1959, almost five years after Brown I. He
issued this opinion, sitting alone, on a request by the School
Board of Charlottesville, Virginia, for a stay of a district court
order admitting twelve black plaintiffs to two formerly all white
public schools. 37 In September, 1958, he had refused a stay in the
same case because the School Board had been unable to give
assurance that the stay, if granted, would have facilitated either
compliance with the district court's general desegregation decree
Hamm v. County School Bd. of Arlington County, 264 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1959) (per
curiam); County School Bd. of Arlington County v. Thompson, 252 F.2d 929 (4th Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 958 (1958).
32. E.g., Goins v. County School Bd. of Grayson County, 282 F.2d 343 (4th Cir. 1960)
(Sobeloff, C.J., sitting as an individual circuit judge); School Bd. of Charlottesville v.
Allen, 263 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1959) (Sobeloff, C.J., sitting as an individual circuit judge).
33. E.g., School Bd. of Warren County v. Kilby, 259 F.2d 497 (4th Cir. 1958) (per
curiam); School Bd. of Norfolk v. Beckett, 260 F.2d 18 (4th Cir. 1958) (per curiam).
34. Board of Educ. of St. Mary's County v. Groves, 261 F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1958) (per
curiam).
35. Hamm v. County School Bd. of Arlington County, 263 F.2d 226 (4th Cir. 1959)
(per curiam) (affirming district court finding of no basis for rejection other than race).
36. Jones v. School Bd. of Alexandria, 278 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1960) (per curiam).
37. School Bd. of Charlottesville v. Allen, 263 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1959) (Sobeloff,
C.J., sitting as an individual circuit judge).
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or reasonably early compliance with the order admitting the
twelve black students.3 1 Virginia school closing laws had earlier
denuded the Charlottesville School Board of the authority to op-
erate the school system once it became subject to a federal court
desegregation order. Consequently, the schools had been closed.
Thereafter, the school closing laws were invalidated,39 and both
the Charlottesville School Board and the City Council gave the
necessary assurances of compliance. Judge Sobeloff, therefore,
granted a limited stay because of what he regarded to be the
School Board's good faith and its stated desire to comply with the
Brown principle at the earliest possible time consistent with pro-
per management of the schools. It is likely that he published his
reasons for granting the stay to encourage other school authorities
to be as cooperative and to engage in voluntary compliance with
the fourteenth amendment and court desegregation orders.40
The initial period in Judge Sobeloff's tenure ended with the
court entering a per curiam opinion validating, as consistent with
the "all deliberate speed" doctrine, the City of Norfolk's interim
plan of "progressive desegregation of grades beginning with high
school and proceeding progressively to the lower grades."4' Thus,
six years after Brown I, the Fourth Circuit agreed that Norfolk
could commence desegregation pursuant to a grade-a-year plan.
But, because the court had become familiar with the realities of
pupil placement laws and tokenism, and the Norfolk School case
itself had already "been frequently before the district court and
three times in this court,"42 the Fourth Circuit was a bit chary in
its opinion. Its affirmance was premised upon "the District
Court's finding that it is the Board's purpose to proceed in good
faith and with reasonable speed in compliance with the direction
of the Supreme Court. . .. "' Further, the plan was accepted as
an interim measure only, "subject to re-examination from time
38. Id. at 295. Stays were also denied in similar circumstances by panels of which
Judge Sobeloff was a member. E.g., School Bd. of Warren County v. Kilby, 259 F.2d 497
(4th Cir. 1958) (per curiam) (no assurances given); School Bd. of Norfolk v. Beckett, 260
F.2d 18 (4th Cir. 1958) (per curiam) (school board guilty of dilatory tactics).
39. James v. Almond, 170 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Va.), aff'd sub nom. Duckworth v.
James, 267 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1959); Harrison v. Day, 200 Va. 439, 106 S.E.2d 636 (1959).
40. Judge Sobeloff's second signed school opinion was issued on September 13,
1960, under similar circumstances. Goins v. County School Bd. of Grayson County, 282
F.2d 343 (4th Cir. 1960) (Sobeloff, C.J., sitting as an individual circuit judge) (application
for stay denied).
41. Hill v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 282 F.2d 473, 475 (4th Cir. 1960) (per curiam).
42. Id. at 474.
43. Id. at 475.
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to time of further plans to effect compliance with the law. .. .
As the initial period ended, it became increasingly clear that
tokenism and gradualism were insufficient to comply with the
Brown mandate. But neither Judge Sobeloff, the Fourth Circuit
nor the Supreme Court had yet been pushed beyond the limits
of endurance.
THE FALL OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE AND TOKENISM
The second period of Judge Sobeloffs tenure commenced in
1961. Both he and his court became more active as did the Su-
preme Court. Pupil placement laws, exhaustion of state remedies,
and many limitations on the scope of class relief were no longer
acceptable. Further, the "all deliberate speed" formula was
found to be an unsatisfactory standard, and the more crass tech-
niques for maintaining segregation, such as minority pupil trans-
fer provisions and grade-a-year plans, were swept aside.
The number of school cases in the Fourth Circuit during this
second period appears to have increased, and the percentage of
reported per curiam decisions declined. Instead of assuming a
cloak of anonymity, individual members of the court regularly
acknowledged their personal responsibility for desegregation rules
of law and rhetoric. Frequently, opinions for both panels and the
court en banc were signed by Judge Sobeloff.
Judge Sobeloff's first signed opinion for a panel of the court
again involved the City of Charlottesville. 4 He sustained a dis-
trict court order refusing to reassign immediately ten black pupils
to previously white schools. The School Board had rejected the
plaintiffs' reassignment applications allegedly because some of
the plaintiffs had exhibited academic credentials substantially
below the average at the white school they wished to attend and
because the others resided closer to the black schools than to the
white schools. The existing rule in the Fourth Circuit was "that
residence and academic attainment tests may be applied in de-
termining what schools children shall attend, provided that fac-
tors of race and color are not considered."4
Even though the school district's desegregation to date had
been pathetically slight, involving the reassignment of fewer than
thirty black children to previously all white schools and the trans-
44. Id.
45. Dodson v. School Bd. of Charlottesville, 289 F.2d 439 (4th Cir. 1961).
46. Id. at 442.
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fer of no white children to previously all black schools, the Fourth
Circuit was satisfied that "there has been some progress towards
desegregating the city's schools."4 The school district's plan,
which "divided the city into six geographical [attendance]
zones, each served by one of the city's six elementary schools"4
and provided for individual pupil placement in each of the city's
two high schools, was held facially "not objectionable on constitu-
tional grounds."49 But, "constitutional infirmities" were found
"in the manner in which the plan is being administered."50
Pursuant to the plan adopted by the Charlottesville School
Board, each elementary school student was to be assigned to the
school located in and serving the attendance zone in which he
resided. At the request of the child's parent, transfer was then to
be considered on the basis of ostensibly neutral criteria. In prac-
tice, however, all black children throughout the city school sys-
tem were initially assigned to the black schools, and all white
children were assigned to the white schools. To secure assignment
to a school of the other race, a child first had to apply for a
transfer. Additionally, high school applicants had to pass scholas-
tic aptitude and intelligence tests.5 '
Despite these blatant infirmities and Judge Sobeloff's ac-
knowledgement that "we would normally be required to reverse"
the district court,5" he declined to reverse and to direct that an
appropriate injunction be entered. The school authorities, as be-
fore, had given assurances of intention to comply with their obli-
gation to desegregate, and the district court had retained jurisdic-
tion of the case to assure compliance. Hence, with confidence
"that steps will be taken promptly to end the present discrimina-
tory practices in the administration of the desegregation plan,"
Judge Sobeloff affirmed the lower court's decision.13
47. Id. at 441.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 442.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 442-43.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 444. The Charlottesville plan came before the court again in Dillard v.
School Bd. of Charlottesville, 308 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1962) (en banc) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 827 (1967). The majority of the court, including Chief Judge Sobeloff,
adopted the opinion of Senior Judge Soper, who had prepared an opinion for the original
panel that heard the case. The Fourth Circuit rejected the Charlottesville plan because:
(1) each elementary school pupil was assigned to a school in his residence zone, but pupils
in a racial minority within their assigned school could freely transfer to a school in which
their race was in the majority; (2) academic tests were given to black pupils seeking to
enroll in the predominantly white high school while white pupils were admitted without
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The unequal administration of pupil placement programs
came before Judge Sobeloff again in 1962. This time, he examined
the administration of such a program in the context of the inter-
play between the School Board of the City of Roanoke, Virginia,
and Virginia's Pupil Placement Board. 54 On this occasion, the
court was not as gentle.
The evidence demonstrated that the School Board operated
a rigid "feeder" school system.
The city schools are divided into six sections, numbered I to
VI. A pupil, when he first enters the city's school system, is
assigned to an elementary school in one of the sections.
When he graduates from the elementary school, he is auto-
matically assigned to the junior high school which serves
that same section. Similarly, upon graduation from junior
high school, he goes to his section's senior high school.55
The "sections" served no defined geographical areas. Theoreti-
cally, they conformed to some amorphous notion of neighborhood
school zones, but there were no maps of these zones. Not surpris-
ingly, "the 'neighborhood' served by section II schools
consist[ed] of the entire Negro community in the city" regard-
less of actual residency. 6 In order to escape from the section II
schools, black students had to apply for transfer. Any transfer
applications were forwarded to the state Pupil Placement Board.
Ordinarily, that Board's role in the assignment of pupils was
largely a formality. The city school authorities recommended to
the state Board assignments for all pupils in the city schools.
Unless a child's parents objected to an assignment, the Pupil
Placement Board automatically ratified all assignments. 7
In 1960, thirty-nine black pupils applied to the City of Roan-
oke School Board for transfer to white schools. Although the ap-
plications were forwarded to the state Board, the city school au-
thorities made no recommendations. With remarkable candor,
the Pupil Placement Board requested that the city school author-
ities answer three questions about the applications: (1) "Are there
Negro pupils who cannot be excluded from attending white
schools except for race?" (2) "Would the Superintendent and
School Board so certify to the Pupil Placement Board?" (3)
tests; and (3) the alternative of sending white pupils to the black high school was never
considered.
54. Green v. School Bd. of Roanoke, 304 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1962).
55. Id. at 120.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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"[Wlhat would happen in the local communities if some Negro
pupils were assigned to white schools?""6 Upon receiving the an-
swers, the state Board denied thirty of the applications and
granted nine. "These nine were the first Negroes to be admitted
to white schools in Roanoke City since the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Brown . . ."
The parents of twenty-eight of the pupils denied transfers
filed suit in federal district court. The School Board contended
that twelve pupils had been denied transfers because their test
scores were below the median of the schools they wished to at-
tend. The transfer applications of five other pupils had been de-
nied because each had a sibling, attending the same school,
whose test scores were below the median of the comparable white
students. Finally, the School Board maintained that eleven of the
pupils had been denied transfers because they lived closer to
black schools than to the white schools they requested. 0
The district judge ruled that there was no need for the plain-
tiffs to exhaust the state administrative remedies because their
transfers had been denied only a few days before the school term
commenced. But, he also ruled that the plaintiffs were not enti-
tled to an injunction barring the continued operation of a segre-
gated school system or requiring a plan for desegregation. Upon
reviewing the denials of the transfer applications, the district
judge sustained twelve, reversed one and directed the school
board to re-examine the remaining applications.'
In his opinion for the Fourth Circuit, Judge Sobeloff reversed
and remanded with directions. Unlike the situation presented in
the Norfolk and Charlottesville cases,6 2 the City of Roanoke de-
fendants "have disavowed any purpose of using their assignment
system as a vehicle to desegregate the schools and have stated
that there was no plan aimed at ending the present practices
which we have found to be discriminatory . . . . 3 Further, the
district court had not recognized the informities of the school
authorities' existing practices and had not "made it clear that
progress toward a completely non-discriminatory school system
58. Id. at 121.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 121-22. One of the plaintiffs actually lived closer to the white school, and
another lived halfway between the black and white schools.
61. Five of the fifteen applications re-examined were granted. In the following school
year, two additional applicants were allowed to transfer. Thus, by the time the appeal was
heard, the number of untransferred appellants was twenty. Id. at 122.
62. See text accompanying notes 37-44 supra.
63. 304 F.2d at 124.
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would be insisted upon." 4 Hence, the decision of the district
court was reversed, and the case was remanded for entry of an
order transferring the plaintiffs.
However, if, upon remand, the defendants desire to submit
to the District Court a plan for ending the existing discrimi-
natory practices, then, rather than the appellants and others
similarly situated all being entitled to immediate admission
to non-segregated schools, their admissions may be in ac-
cordance with the plan. Any such plan, before being ap-
proved by the District Court, should provide for immediate
steps looking to the termination of the discriminatory prac-
tices "with all deliberate speed" in accordance with a speci-
fied time table.65
Judge Sobeloff, thus, began to demonstrate his own impatience,
and that of his court, with the interminable delays fashioned by
various school districts.
Judge Sobeloff's impatience was even more unmistakable in
a case, decided a month later, involving the derelictions of the
Roanoke County School authorities.6 The county school authori-
ties placed pupils in the public schools pursuant to a rigid
"feeder" system similar to that of Roanoke City. This "feeder"
system purposefully perpetuated a segregated school system and
was "maintained in flagrant disregard of the Supreme Court's
decisions in [Brown I and Brown Il] . . . and of this court's
unmistakable declaration that '[o]bviously the maintenance of
a dual system of attendance areas based on race offends the con-
stitutional rights of the plaintiffs and others similarly situated
and cannot be tolerated.' "7
The same district judge who had heard the Roanoke City
case decided in the Roanoke County case that the plaintiffs could
not press their federal lawsuit for failure to exhaust their state
administrative remedies. The plaintiffs had not, as required by a
regulation of the state Pupil Placement Board, filed their transfer
applications at least sixty days prior to the commencement of the
school year.
Chastising the state Pupil Placement Board for refusing to
"try to bring about the desegregation of the State of Virginia,""8
64. Id.
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. Marsh v. County School Bd. of Roanoke County, 305 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1962).
67. Id. at 96 (quoting from Jones v. School Bd. of Alexandria, 278 F.2d 72, 76 (4th
Cir. 1960)).
68. Marsh v. County School Bd. of Roanoke County, 305 F.2d 94, 99 (4th Cir. 1962).
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Judge Sobeloff ruled that "where the discrimination relates back
to the initial assignments, the sixty-day rule may not be used as
a pretext to defeat the vindication of constitutional rights.""9
Carson v. Warlick,7° requiring exhaustion of state remedies, was
again limited to the proposition that although a pupil placement
law is "not unconstitutional on its face, . . . administrative rem-
edies need [not] be exhausted if they were shown to be a part of
the discriminatory administration of the Act."'" Judge Sobeloff
then reversed and remanded for "a declaratory judgment that the
defendants are administering the Pupil Placement Act in an
unconstitutional manner .... "72 Unless the defendants sub-
mitted "a plan for ending the existing discrimination . . . 'in
accordance with a specified time table,' ",n3 the district court was
ordered to enter "an injunction against the further use of racially
discriminatory criteria in the assignment of pupils to schools."7
Judge Sobeloff further directed the district court to issue
promptly an injunction "so as to control the assignment of pupils
for the coming 1962-63 school year."75 Thus, the limitations on
class relief were being eliminated through injunctions requiring
comprehensive pupil placement plans.
Further indication of the court's new direction was provided
by the disposition of the Lynchburg, Virginia, desegregation law-
suit. The appeal had been argued on September 25, 1962, and,
three days later, by a per curiam order, the district court's refusal
to admit two of the four plaintiffs to previously all white schools
was reversed." The class issues, however, were not settled until
June 29, 1963.11 This was an unusual lapse of time. Judge Sobel-
off, as chief judge, was sensitive to the court's obligation to keep
its docket current. Further, he was anxious to avoid delay in
school desegregation cases where a month's delay in court could
defer desegregation for an entire school year. But, in this in-
stance, the delay was explainable.
The Fourth Circuit was awaiting a determination by the
69. Id. at 98.
70. 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956).
71. Marsh v. County School Bd. of Roanoke County, 305 F.2d 94, 99 (4th Cir. 1962).
72. Id. at 99.
73. Id. at 99-100 (quoting Green v. School Bd. of Roanoke, 304 F.2d 118, 124 (4th
Cir. 1962)).
74. Id. at 99.
75. Id. Accord, Wheeler v. Durham City Bd. of Educ., 309 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1962)
(en banc) (Sobeloff, C.J.); Jeffers v. Whitley, 309 F.2d 621 (4th Cir. 1962) (en banc) (per
curiam).
76. Jackson v. School Bd. of Lynchburg, 308 F.2d 918 (4th Cir. 1962).
77. Jackson v. School Bd. of Lynchburg, 321 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1963).
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Supreme Court of one of the issues presented by the Lynchburg
case. The Supreme Court decision was not delivered until June
3, 1963.18 The Court agreed with the Fourth Circuit position that
a minority pupil transfer provision, allowing children who are in
a minority race within the school to which they have been as-
signed to transfer freely to a school in which they are in the
majority race, was unconstitutional. Subsequently, in deciding
the class action issues in the Lynchburg case, the Fourth Circuit
began by invalidating the city's minority student transfer provi-
sion .
The Lynchburg case raised two additional class action issues
which Judge Sobeloff creatively decided. First, giving a broad
reading to a signal from the Supreme Court that nine years after
Brown I it was becoming impatient with the "all deliberate
speed" formula, 8 Judge Sobeloff persuaded his court to join the
Third, Fifth and Sixth Circuits in ruling that desegregation by a
grade-a-year "time schedule is too slow and unduly protracts the
process of desegregation."8 The second class action point was
equally important, for it significantly extended the scope of the
desegregation plans that the Fourth Circuit would thereafter in-
sist upon. The defendants' plan had been opposed by the plain-
tiffs on grounds
such as the failure to delineate proper zones, to spell out
details with respect to assignments and deadlines, and to
provide for notifying parents and children of their rights
under the plan and how these rights may be vindicated.
They further complain that the plan fails to provide for de-
segregation of faculty and staff, or the special classes for
handicapped and gifted children, or adult education classes,
or vocational and commercial education, or kindergarten
and other pre-school as well as summer school programs.
Again, giving a liberal reading to the Supreme Court's statement
that the requirement of desegregation dictated by the Constitu-
tion "would . . . [no longer] be fully satisfied by types of plans
or programs for desegregation of public educational facilities
78. Goss v. Board of Educ. of Knoxville, 373 U.S. 683 (1963). On June 17, 1963,
certiorari was denied in the Fourth Circuit case raising the same issue. Dillard v. School
Bd. of Charlottesville, 308 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1962) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied,
374 U.S. 827 (1963).
79. Jackson v. School Bd. of Lynchburg, 321 F.2d 230, 231 (4th Cir. 1960).
80. See Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 529-30 (1963).
81. Jackson v. School Bd. of Lynchburg, 321 F.2d 230, 231, 233 (4th Cir. 1963).
82. Id. at 233.
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which eight years ago might have been deemed sufficient,''"
Judge Sobeloff ordered the district court promptly, for use in the
imminent 1963-64 school year, "to undertake a detailed rewriting
of the board's plan [and] . . . to perform the task comprehen-
sively to bring the plan into full conformity with the law. '84
In his next school case, Bell v. School Board of Powhatan
County,85 Judge Sobeloff accelerated the pace for judicial inter-
vention in public school desegregation. The Powhatan County
school system consisted of two schools, each encompassing all
grades from elementary through high school. The Powhatan
School was designated for white pupils and was staffed exclu-
sively by white personnel while the Pocahontas School was desig-
nated for-black pupils and staffed by black personnel. There had
been absolutely no change in the racial composition of these
schools since the Supreme Court's decision in Brown II. After
frustrating efforts to transfer to the all white school, in the sum-
mer of 1962 sixty-five black children and their parents filed a
class action against the School Board, the superintendent of
schools and the members of the Virginia Pupil Placement Board.
Judge Sobeloff observed:
The record discloses a persistent purpose and plan on the
part of the defendants to deny the plaintiffs their constitu-
tional rights and pretextuously to invoke against them rules
which in practice had no application to white pupils. This
the defendants did after making it difficult, if not impossi-
ble, for the rules to be complied with, by failing to make
available before the deadline sufficient official application
forms and later refusing to consider applications not on offi-
cial forms. They furthered their obstructive purpose by re-
fusing to act upon applications, regardless of when made,
and by interposing captious objections that applications had
been presented to the Division of Superintendent instead of
to the school principal, when in fact the defendants knew
that the plaintiffs would quite naturally rely on the regula-
tion of the Pupil Placement Board which specified filing with
the Division Superintendent. 8
The district court had found the facts to be substantially as
alleged by the plaintiffs and had issued an injunction against a
racially discriminatory admission policy. Noting developments in
83. Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 530 (1963).
84. Jackson v. School Bd. of Lynchburg, 321 F.2d 230, 233 (4th Cir. 1963).
85. 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963) (en banc).
86. Id. at 497-98.
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nearby Prince Edward County,87 the district court also had en-
joined the defendants from closing their schools. The district
judge had further directed the defendants to submit a plan for
desegregation within ninety days. He had also invoked the doc-
trine of abstention because of the pendency of a state court pro-
ceeding. The state suit had been arranged between the local
school board and the state Pupil Placement Board to determine
whether the local school authorities were obligated to investigate
the genuineness of the transfer applications. Consequently, the
district court had not acted on the transfer requests of the named
plaintiffs, except those of the three who had specifically moved
for an interlocutory injunction. Their motions had been granted."
Finally, the district court had denied counsel fees to the plain-
tiffs' attorneys.89
Judge Sobeloff delivered the local school authorities a sting-
ing lecture and affirmed the district court order in all but two
respects. First, since the Supreme Court had recently ruled that
the vindication of rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal court
desegregation suits was not to be delayed for exhaustion of state
remedies, 0 the district judge was instructed that he should not
have abstained from consideration of the plaintiffs' transfer ap-
plications. According to Judge Sobeloff, all the plaintiffs were
"entitled to admission at the opening of the school year in Sep-
87. For a number of years, until an appropriate court order was entered by direction
of the United States Supreme Court, the public schools of Prince Edward County, Vir-
ginia, were closed. See Griffin v. Board of Supervisors of Prince Edward County, 322 F.2d
332 (4th Cir. 1963), rev'd sub nom. Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County,
377 U.S. 218 (1964); Allen v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 207 F. Supp.
349 (E.D. Va. 1962).
As one of Judge Sobeloff's law clerks at the time, I observed the resolution of that
case within the Fourth Circuit. Judge Sobeloff had proposed that his colleagues consider
the case en banc. However, as a district court judge, Judge Albert V. Bryan, then of the
Fourth Circuit, had treated several aspects of the litigation. Further, the Prince Edward
County case was one of the five cases consolidated before the Supreme Court for decision
in Brown I, and Judge Sobeloff, participating in the argument of Brown II, had, thus,
entered an appearance as an attorney in the case nine years earlier. When the court was
convened for argument, Chief Judge Sobeloff disclosed the prior connections that both he
and Judge Bryan had with the case and announced that if any party to the appeal objected
to participation by either him or Judge Bryan, they would both recuse themselves. An
objection was lodged, causing the case to be heard therefore by a panel composed of Judges
Haynsworth, Boreman, and J. Spencer Bell. The Fourth Circuit's opinion was signed by
Judge Haynsworth; Judge Bell filed a dissenting opinion.
88. Bell v. School Bd. of Powhatan County, 321 F.2d 494, 497 (4th Cir. 1963) (en
banc).
89. Id. at 500.
90. McNeese v. Board of Educ. for Community School Unit, Dist. No. 187, 373 U.S.
668, 676 (1963).
[VOL. XXXIV
TRIBUTE TO SIMON E. SOBELOFF
tember, 1963 . . ".' The holding of Carson v. Warlick was
finally laid to rest, and named plaintiffs in public school desegre-
gation suits could anticipate speedy vindication of their individ-
ual rights.
Judge Sobeloff's second point of disagreement with the dis-
trict judge is particularly interesting because it preceded Su-
preme Court and congressional action on the subject. The district
judge had denied the plaintiffs' request for reasonable counsel
fees. Judge Sobeloff recognized that "[t]he general rule is that
the award of counsel fees lies within the sound discretion of the
trial court ... ."92 However, reviewing the denial "in the
perspective of all the surrounding circumstances," he reasoned
that the defendants' "long continued pattern of evasion and
obstruction" made it clear that "[tihe equitable remedy . . .
[would be] far from complete, and justice would not be attained,
if reasonable counsel fees were not awarded in a case so ex-
treme. 913 This appears to be the first reported school case in
which counsel fees were directed by an appellate court.
I was Judge Sobeloff's law clerk when Bell was heard and
decided and, therefore, remember the decisional process well.
Immediately following the argument and the judges' initial con-
ference, Judge Sobeloff and I sat down to discuss the case and the
preparation of the opinion. We began with a discussion of the
bench memorandum that I had prepared for him prior to the
argument. It was the Judge's practice to read manuscripts with
a pencil in his hand which, from a law clerk's perspective, he
sometimes employed promiscuously. Thus, as we read the memo-
randum and discussed the case, he nimbly rewrote and edited the
manuscript, transforming it, as he always did with the drafts or
memoranda prepared by his law clerks, entirely into his own
product. I recall my suprise when we finished the manuscript,
and he declared that I was to add a few case references, check the
others, and have the manuscript retyped as the draft opinion. I
was even more surprised when he informed me that he intended
to propose to his colleagues that they reverse on the attorneys'
fees point. Since it was then near the end of my clerkship with
the Judge and I was reasonably familiar with his court, the Judge
did not consider it presumptuous when I suggested that it was
91. Bell v. School Bd. of Powhatan County, 321 F.2d 494, 499-500 (4th Cir. 1963)
(en banc).
92. Id.
93. Id.
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unlikely that he could muster a majority for this position. He
could count on Judge J. Spencer Bell," but I doubted that he
could persuade Judge Haynsworth, Judge Boreman or Judge
Bryan. Perhaps, he had received some contrary indication in the
judges' conference. On the other hand, he may simply have
thought that the defendants' actions were so outrageous as to
warrant the effort, however futile, to convince his colleagues. Ul-
timately, Judges Bryan and Bell agreed with him on the counsel
fees point. 5 Judges Haynsworth and Boreman dissented from the
direction that counsel fees be awarded, but otherwise concurred
in the decision.9
Thereafter, the court occasionally directed district courts to
reconsider requests for counsel fees in school cases. But, counsel
fees awards were not again expressly ordered by the court until
Congress authorized them in school cases. 9 Even after the district
court had awarded counsel fees for work performed in the Rich-
mond case prior to the effective date of the federal statute, a
divided Fourth Circuit disallowed them.99
After the Bell decision, Judge Sobeloff continued to
champion the cause of counsel fees in civil rights cases. He dis-
sented from the court's treatment of the counsel fees issue in one
of the interminable rounds of the Richmond school litigation. The
majority of the court affirmed an award of only $75.00 in attor-
neys' fees.'1 Judge Sobeloff protested the court's conclusion that
Bell was limited to the proposition: "Attorneys' fees are appropri-
ate only when it is found that the bringing of the action should
have been unnecessary and was compelled by the school board's
unreasonable, obdurate obstinacy." ' Anticipating both Con-
gress and the Supreme Court, Judge Sobeloff would have
94. With unerring consistency, Judges Sobeloff and J. Spencer Bell voted together,
especially in civil rights, civil liberties, labor, and criminal law cases.
95. Thereafter, Judge Bryan did not always agree with Judge Sobeloff about the
propriety of counsel fees. See Buckner v. County School Bd. of Greene County, 332 F.2d
452, 456 (4th Cir. 1964) (Bryan, J., dissenting).
96. Bell v. School Bd. of Powhatan County, 321 F.2d 494, 500 (4th Cir. 1963) (en
banc) (Haynsworth and Boreman, JJ., dissenting only from the award of counsel fees).
97. Brown v. County School Bd. of Frederick County, 327 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1964)
(en banc) (per curiam); Buckner v. County School Bd. of Greene County, 332 F.2d 452
(4th Cir. 1964).
98. 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (Supp. 1973). See Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis,
412 U.S. 427 (1973).
99. Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 472 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1972), vacated, 416
U.S. 696 (1974) (within the discretion of the trial court to award counsel fees).
100. Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 345 F.2d 310, 321 (4th Cir. 1965) (Sobeloff
and J. Spencer Bell, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
101. Id. at 321.
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awarded counsel fees "whenever children are compelled by delib-
erate official action or inaction to resort to lawyers and courts to
vindicate their clearly established and indisputable right to a
desegregated education."'' 2
Near the end of the second period of Judge Sobelof's school
decisions, questions of what constituted full compliance with the
Brown principle began to surface. Initially, the Briggs v. Elliott03
dictum, requiring desegregation rather than integration, was
tested through procedural maneuvers. Several years later, the
courts had to treat its substance.
The first notable procedural test occurred in 1963 when the
School Board of Arlington County, Virginia, had the audacity to
move to dissolve the desegregation injunction that had been en-
tered in 1956. The School Board maintained that "its policy of
segregation no longer existed and the injunction was unneces-
sary."'' 4 Remarkably, the district court granted the motion, dis-
solved the injunction and dismissed the entire case from its
docket.0 5 Writing for a panel which included Judges Haynsworth
and Boreman, Judge Sobeloff unequivocally reversed the lower
court judgment. Surveying the School Board's long history of
segregation and resistance both to the Brown decisions and to an
orderly resolution of the case, he was singularly unimpressed by
the facts that:
the Arlington County governmental body had adopted an
ordinance electing to remove the school assignment power
from the state Pupil Placement Board to the local School
Board and that on September 21, 1961, the Board had
adopted a resolution rescinding the policy of segregation...
[and that the Board had ruled] that attendance shall be in
accordance with residential areas fixed by the School Board
from time to time . .. .,6
Rather, Judge Sobeloff concluded that the School Board's history
102. Id. at 324. Accord Felder v. Harnett County Bd. of Educ., 409 F.2d 1070, 1075-
76 (4th Cir. 1969) (en banc) (Sobeloff and Winter, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part), where Judge Sobeloff would have awarded counsel fees to the plaintiffs because
of the defendants' "frivolous appeal." Cf. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S.
400 (1968), aff'g, 377 F.2d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 1967) (en banc) (Winter and Sobeloff, JJ.,
concurring).
103. 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955). See text accompanying notes 25 and 26
supra.
104. Brooks v. County School Bd. of Arlington County, 324 F.2d 303, 305 (4th Cir.
1963), rev'g 204 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1962).
105. 204 F. Supp. 620.
106. 324 F.2d at 305.
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of segregation and obstruction clearly had not been dissipated by
its few recent actions. Specifically, the Board's new pupil place-
ment program included a minority pupil transfer provision simi-
lar to the provisions declared uhlawful by the Supreme Court and
the Fourth Circuit.'"7 Judge Sobeloff then determined: "The Dis-
trict Court's finding that there is no evidence to sustain the
charge that geographic boundaries were established to maintain
segregation is clearly erroneous."''08 At most, the School Board's
recent conduct was found to constitute a "good faith beginning
of compliance [which] might be a defense to a contempt citation
for violating an injunction; it is no ground for rescission."'0 9
The next round of litigation involving the Arlington County
school system was even more bizarre. In 1965, writing for the
court, Judge Sobeloff decided the fifth appeal to bring the public
school problems of Arlington County before the court."0 "The
novel feature of the present appeal is that when the Board acted,
as it thought, to comply with earlier orders of this court as well
as to improve the education system of the county, it was, at the
instance of white parents, enjoined by the district court from
putting its plans into effect.""' Finally beginning to recognize its
constitutional obligation, the School Board had divided the
county into two integrated public school attendance districts for
junior high school, replacing the three segregated districts that
had previously existed. The racial composition of each of the new
districts was approximately 75% white and 25% black. For each
junior high school grade, all of the students in a district attended
school in the same building. In one district, Jefferson, this meant
that all seventh graders were housed in one school while all eighth
and ninth graders were housed in another school. In a suit
brought by white parents, the district court found the plan un-
lawful "on the grounds that the School Board 'took race into
consideration' in redrawing the boundary lines, and that the
plaintiffs are denied equal educational opportunities because the
newly-created Jefferson District will be maintained not as a
single-' but as a dual-building district, separating the seventh
grade pupils from the eighth and ninth grade pupils.""'
107. Id. at 307.
108. Id. at 308.
109. Id. Accord, Bowditch v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 345 F.2d 329, 332 (4th
Cir. 1965) (en banc) (Sobeloff and J. Spencer Bell, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
110. Wanner v. County School Bd. of Arlington County, 357 F.2d 452 (4th Cir. 1965).
111. Id. at 453 (footnote omitted).
112. Id. at 454.
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Judge Sobeloff left no doubt as to the position he was taking
when dealing with a school board's good faith exercise of discre-
tion to dismantle a formerly biracial school system. He distin-
guished between what a court could require a school district to
do and what a school district could do voluntarily to desegre-
gate'13 and then declared:
It would be stultifying to hold that a board may not move
to undo arrangements artifically contrived to effect or main-
tain segregation on the ground that this interference with the
status quo would involve "consideration of race." When
school authorities recognizing the historic fact that existing
conditions are based on a design to segregate the races, act
to undo these illegal conditions-especially conditions that
have been judicially condemned-their effort is not to be
frustrated on the ground that race is not a permissible con-
sideration. This is not the "consideration of race" which the
Constitution discountenances.'"
Judge Sobeloff further ruled that the district court's finding
that the School Board's plan denied the white students equal
education opportunity was "clearly erroneous."" 5 More signifi-
cantly, he lectured the district court on the applicable legal stan-
dard: "where a school board is attempting in good faith to elimi-
nate or reduce segregation, courts are not commissioned to enter
into a debate with school authorities as to which redistricting
plan among several is preferable from an educational stand-
point.""' Additionally, he stated that "[t]here is no legally pro-
tected vested interest in segregation."" 7 The Supreme Court,
passing upon similar issues in 1971, essentially agreed."8
As a corollary to the Arlington County decisions, the Fourth
Circuit later ruled, with Judge Sobeloff entering a special con-
currence, that white children who have been assigned to desegre-
gated schools have standing to challenge a school system's deseg-
regation plan on the ground that "the school to which they are
assigned is not a part of a unitary school system, but has instead
been singled out for arbitrary mixing to appease the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare and the federal courts."",
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 456.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 454.
118. McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971).
119. Whitley v. Wilson City Bd. of Educ., 427 F.2d 179, 181 (4th Cir. 1970) (en
banc).
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Judge Sobeloff observed in his concurring opinion that "[wihen
the controversy is fit for judicial scrutiny and within the outer
bounds of Article III, a federal court should not introduce unnec-
essary standing barriers, but should proceed to the merits and
end further delay in the implementation of the mandate of
Brown." 20
Having determined that individual plaintiffs cannot be re-
quired to exhaust state remedies prior to securing federal judicial
vindication of their fourteenth amendment rights to a desegre-
gated education,' 2 ' that a mere "good faith beginning" toward
compliance with a school board's equal education obligation is
insufficient to free a school board from district court equity
supervision,'2 2 and that white parents and children have no le-
gally cognizable interest in opposing race-conscious desegregation
plans'23 (but are entitled to challenge continued maintenance of
a dual school system),'2 Judge Sobeloff then addressed several
converse porpositions. A class action was brought on behalf of
several black children in Greene County, Virginia, requesting
"admission of the named plaintiffs to a specified school" and "an
injunction against the operation of a biracial school system
throughout the county . .""'. After the filing of the lawsuit, the
Virginia Pupil Placement Board granted the transfer applications
of six of the plaintiffs, one child had withdrawn his application,
and the remaining two children were disqualified on ostensibly
neutral grounds. "The District .Court, believing the case to be
moot because all of the individual infant plaintiffs were in schools
chosen by their parents or legal guardians, removed the case from
the active docket," refused "to consider injunctive relief and
terminat[ed] the suit . "... ,12 The case was reversed and re-
manded for a hearing to formulate a desegregation plan and to
consider an award of counsel fees. Judge Sobeloff noted: "It is too
late in the day for this school board to say that merely by the
admission of a few plaintiffs without taking any further action,
it is satisfying the Supreme Court's mandate for 'good faith com-
120. Id. at 183 (Sobeloff, J., concurring).
121. Bell v. School Bd. of Powhatan County, 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963) (en banc).
122. Brooks v. County School Bd. of Arlington County, 324 F.2d 303, 308 (4th Cir.
1963).
123. Wanner v. County School Bd. of Arlington County, 357 F.2d 452 (4th Cir. 1966).
124. Whitley v. Wilson City Bd. of Educ., 427 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1970) (en banc).
125. Buckner v. County School Bd. of Greene County, 332 F.2d 452, 453 (4th Cir.
1964) (en banc).
126. Id. at 453.
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pliance at the earliest practicable date.' "127 Thus, he served no-
tice that mootness would be no more availing than either exhaus-
tion or abstention in foreclosing meaningful class action relief.
Tokenism was now unacceptable, and comprehensive desegrega-
tion plans would hereinafter be required. Individual black plain-
tiffs now had broad standing to secure the constitutional interests
of their class even after having vindicated their individual inter-
ests.
GIVING MEANING To INTEGRATION
The second stage of Judge Sobeloff's school desegregation
decisions had now ended. Several factors signaled the passage
into the third stage. Generally, tokenism was judicially declared
to be dead, and elimination of segregation was mandated by Con-
gress. "'28 However, few appellate school decisions, including those
of the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court, were unanimous.
The issues in school cases had simultaneously become more sim-
plified and more complex. Desegregation and integration contin-
ued to be the germinal concern, but attention also focused on
equal educational opportunities that were more broadly defined
to include such matters as the efficacy of school programs and
philosophies. 1"9 Finally, the Supreme Court required that public
schools had to be integrated, not desegregated.' 30 This pronounce-
ment however, did not end the debate. More subtle issues began
to arise. Does integration mean racial balance? How is integration
in public schools to be achieved when residential neighborhoods
are segregated? 3' How is "white flight" to be dealt with?1 32 What
happens when white portions of biracial school districts formally
secede and establish new uniracial school districts?3 3 What hap-
pens when white students transfer from public schools to private
schools? Does de facto segregation violate the Constitution?' 34 If
not, how does one prove de jure segregation in racially segregated
school systems located in states in which no law mandated sepa-
127. Id. at 454. l,
128. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c to 2000c-9 (1970).
129. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, 380 F. Supp. 673 (D. Colo. 1974),
appeal pending, Nos. 74-1349-51 (10th Cir.).
130. E.g., Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968);
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
131. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1972).
132. See Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
133. See Brunson v. Board of Trustees of School Dist. No. 1, Clarendon County, 429
F.2d 820 (4th Cir. 1970) (en banc).
134. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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ration of the races?' 5 Can an unconstitutional denial of equal
educational opportunity be proven in the absence of proof of un-
lawful racial or ethnic segregation?' 3 These questions faced the
Supreme Court in the 1970's.
Judge Sobeloff addressed many of the subtle issues of equal
educational opportunity to come before the federal courts in the
late 1960's and early 1970's. Indeed, he participated in some of
the cases that ultimately presented these subtleties to the Su-
preme Court. Typically, he and a majority of the Fourth Circuit
did not agree on approaches or answers. Tested by the standard
of Supreme Court approval, Judge Sobeloff was correct more
often than were his colleagues.
The transition from the second to the third stage of Judge
Sobeloff's school decisions was symbolized by certain occurrences
within the Fourth Circuit itself. In December 1965, having at-
tained the age of seventy, Judge Sobeloff relinquished his position
as chief judge. Also, shortly before his retirement as chief judge,
the court began hearing virtually all school desegregation cases
en banc. Judge Sobeloff continued to participate in these hear-
ings before the full court until he retired to senior judge status in
1971.
After his retirement as chief judge, Judge Sobeloff signed
only one school opinion for a majority of the court.'37 His author-
ship of numerous separate opinions indicates that he could no
longer speak consistently for a majority of the court. Nevertheless
he frequently chose to join the opinions prepared by his colleagues
without further comment.' 8
Judge Sobeloff acquiesced in the views of his judicial
brethren for various reasons. On some occasions, he agreed almost
completely with the position expressed by his colleagues. At other
times, his silence was due to a sense of judicial expediency. He
always accepted, as a fundamental principle of judicial state-
craft, that a judge had limited credit upon which to draw to stand
separate and apart from the majority on his court. Hence, Judge
Sobeloff considered preparing many more dissenting and concur-
135. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Cisneros'v.
Corpus Christi Independent School Dist., 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc), cert.
denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973); United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848 (5th Cir.
1972) (en banc).
136. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools,
351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972), aff'd, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974). See generally 1974
Education Amendments, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-21 (Supp. 1975).
137. Wannerv. County School Bd. of Arlington County, 357 F.2d 452 (4th Cir. 1966).
138. E.g., Wall v. Stanly County Bd. of Educ., 378 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1967) (en
banc).
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ring opinions than he ever filed.' 9 Often, circulation of a separate
opinion among his colleagues was sufficient to alter the shape and
thrust of the majority opinion, making it unnecessary for Judge
Sobeloff to express his views separately. Even in those instances
when only a modicum of compromise was achieved, Judge Sobel-
off, to preserve his credibility, sometimes accepted the gain and
withheld publication of a separate view.
When Judge Sobeloff chose to file a separate opinion, he did
so for at least one of four reasons. He may have wanted to empha-
size an important point not adequately articulated by the major-
ity. Perhaps, he saw an opportunity to air an alternative formula-
tion that might then be tested in subsequent cases. He sometimes
felt it necessary to explain an apparent inconsistency between the
court's decision and some prior result and formulation. Finally,
he may have chosen to express sharp disagreement with the ma-
jority in the hope either that other inferior courts would accept
his view or that the Supreme Court would note the dissent and
review the decision. In such instances, Judge Sobeloff's dissent-
ing opinions were, in effect, petitions for writs of certiorari. His
rate of success in so directing cases to the Supreme Court and in
having his position adopted was remarkably high and tends to
confirm what political scientists have termed the "cue theory" of
appellate review. " " In 1967, I received evidence of the influence
of a Sobeloff dissent. A former clerk to a Supreme Court Justice
informed me that had it not been for Judge Sobeloff's separate
opinion in a school case, the Supreme Court would not have re-
viewed the Fourth Circuit's decision. He was speaking of an early
round in the Richmond school litigation."'
In the midst of the proceedings challenging the constitution-
ality of Richmond's public school system, the School Board had
passed several resolutions eliminating rigid school assignment.
The Board then adopted an open enrollment system whereby,
subject only to school capacity and timeliness of application,
each student freely selected his school upon entering elementary
school. The new system also permitted any student to transfer to
another school of his choice. A majority of the court sustained this
plan, observing "that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibition is
139. Cf. A. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS (1957).
140. J. Tanenhaus, M. Schick, M. Muraskin, D. Rosen, The Supreme Court's
Certiorari Jurisdiction: The Cue Theory, in JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 111 (G. Schubert
ed. 1963).
141. Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 345 F.2d 310, 321 (4th Cir. 1965) (en banc)
(Sobeloff and J. Spencer Bell, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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not against segregation as such. The proscription is against dis-
crimination.' 42
Joined by Judge J. Spencer Bell, Judge Sobeloff concurred
in part and dissented in part.' Accepting the School Board's
open enrollment Resolution as only an interim measure subject
to immediate re-evaluation by the district court, he concurred in
the majority's approval of the plan "in the hope of encouraging
the Board so to administer the Resolution as to make it a genuine
and effective plan of desegregation .. ".. ,,44 But, Judge Sobeloff
left no doubt that he was unimpressed by the Board's efforts to
date and that he questioned the adequacy of the freedom of
choice plan. Disagreeing with the majority, he insisted that
school authorities have an affirmative obligation to integrate and
not merely to desegregate dual school systems. 4 1 Judge Sobeloff,
therefore, could not agree with the majority and the district court
that the open enrollment plan justified dissolution of the injunc-
tion against the School Board. 14 Further, he dissented from the
majority's refusal to order an immediate inquiry into faculty de-
segregation. Clearly, the plaintiff students and parents had
standing to raise this issue. "Indeed, as long as there is a strict
separation of the races in faculties, schools will remain 'white'
and 'Negro,' making student desegregation more difficult.'
1 47
Noting that the issue had been squarely presented to the district
court, Judge Sobeloff observed: "There is no legal reason why
142. Id. at 316.
143. Id. at 321.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 323. Judge Sobeloff was not, however, prepared to propose either busing
or racial balance-issues not then before the court. In another concurring opinion, filed
the same day, Judge Sobeloff elaborated on his position in the Bradley case. He endorsed
the neighborhood school but only
insofar as zone boundaries are drawn without racial discrimination along natural
geographical lines . . . .We are conscious, however that the size and location of a
school building may determine the character of the neighborhood it serves. ...
[SIchool building plans may [not] be employed to perpetuate and promote segre-
gation.
Gilliam v. School Bd. of Hopewell, 345 F.2d 325, 329 (4th Cir. 1965) (en banc) (Sobeloff
and J. Spencer Bell, JJ., concurring separately). Accord, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 29, 33 (4th Cir. 1966) (en banc) (Sobeloff and J. Spencer Bell,
JJ., concurring).
146. Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 345 F.2d 310, 321 (4th Cir. 1965) (en banc)
(Sobeloff and J. Spencer Bell, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also
Bowditch v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 345 F.2d 329, 332 (4th Cir. 1965) (en banc)
(Sobeloff and J. Spencer Bell, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
147. Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 345 F.2d 310, 324 (4th Cir. 1965) (en banc)
(Sobeloff and J. Spencer Bell, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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desegregation of faculties and student bodies may not proceed
simultaneously." 4
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and, in a per
curiam opinion, reversed and remanded. The Court accepted
Judge Sobeloffis position on the issue of faculty desegregation and
held that the plaintiffs were entitled to a full and immediate
evidentiary hearing upon their contention that faculty allocation
on an alleged racial basis rendered the defendants' plan inade-
quate under the principles of Brown. '
Judge Sobeloff continued to pursue his attack, begun in the
Richmond case, on the unfortunate dictum in Briggs v. Elliott
that the Constitution requires desegregation, not integration.
Consequently, in the Charles City County and New Kent County
school cases, he wrote a special concurrence declaring:
"Freedom of choice" is not a sacred talisman; it is only a
means to a constitutionally required end-the abolition of
the system of segregation and its effects. If the means prove
effective, it is acceptable, but if it fails to undo segregation,
other means must be used to achieve this end. The school
officials have the continuing duty to take whatever action
may be necessary to create a "unitary, non-racial system."' 50
On this occasion, too, the Supreme Court accepted Judge
Sobeloff's invitation to review.' 5 ' Specifically adopting Judge
Sobeloff's view that although freedom of choice may be a permis-
sible desegregation technique, it is not a complete solution,'52 the
Supreme Court brushed aside the Briggs v. Elliott philosophy.
Brown II was a call for the dismantling of well-entrenched
dual systems tempered by an awareness that complex and
multi-faceted problems would arise which would require
time and flexibility for a successful resolution. School boards
148. Id. at 324.
149. Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 382 U.S. 103 (1965) (per curiam). There-
after, Judge Sobeloff continued to press his court on the issue of faculty desegregation.
Chambers v. Iredell County Bd. of Educ. 423 F.2d 613, 618-20 (4th Cir. 1970) (en banc)
(Sobeloff and Winter, JJ., dissenting from the court's refusal to "order a preventive
injunction against discriminatory hiring .. "); Bowman v. County School Bd. of
Charles City County, 382 F.2d 326, 335-36 (4th Cir. 1967) (en banc) (Sobeloff and Winter,
JJ., concurring).
150. Bowman v. County School Bd. of Charles City County, 382 F.2d 326, 333 (4th
Cir. 1967) (en banc) (Sobeloff and Winter, JJ., concurring specially) (footnote omitted).
Judge Sobeloff's opinion was also a special concurrence in the court's decision in Green
v. County School Rd. of New Kent County, 382 F.2d 338 (4th Cir. 1967) (en banc).
151. Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968).
152. Id. at 439-40.
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such as the respondent then operating state-compelled dual
systems were nevertheless clearly charged with the affirma-
tive duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to con-
vert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would
be eliminated root and branch.'3
The Supreme Court then ruled: "The New Kent School
Board's 'freedom-of-choice' plan cannot be accepted as a suffi-
cient step to 'effectuate a transition' to a unitary system."'54
There had been no shift of white students to formerly black
schools, and the transfer of black students to formerly white
schools was negligible. "In other words, the school system re-
mains a dual system. Rather than further the dismantling of the
dual system, the plan has operated simply to burden children and
their parents with the responsibility which Brown H placed
squarely on the School Board.""'55 The Court ordered that the
Board "formulate a new plan and, in light of other courses which
appear open to the Board, such as zoning, fashion steps which
promise realistically to convert promptly to a system without a
'white' school and a 'Negro' school, but just schools."'5 6
Throughout the remainder of his career, Judge Sobeloff con-
tinued in step with the Supreme Court on the implementation of
the "root and branch" principle. For example, his separate opin-
ion entered in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
153. Id. at 437-38. Subsequently, in Walker v. County School Bd. of Brunswick
County, 413 F.2d 53, 54 n.2 (4th Cir.) (per curiam) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1061 (1969), the Fourth Circuit explicitly rejected the Briggs v. Elliott dictum.
154. 391 U.S. at 441.
155. 391 U.S. at 441-42.
156. Id. at 442. The reference to zoning was employed to flag an observation in Judge
Sobeloff's opinion that:
"In view of the situation found in New Kent County, where there is no residential
segregation, the elimination of the dual school system and the establishment of a
'unitary, non-racial system' could be readily achieved with a minimum of adminis-
trative difficulty by means of geographic zoning-simply by assigning students
living in the eastern half of the county to the New Kent School and those living in
the western half of the county to the Watkins School. Although a geographical
formula is not universally appropriate, it is evident that here the Board, by sepa-
rately busing Negro children across the entire county to the 'Negro' school, and the
white children to the 'white' school, is deliberately maintaining a segregated system
which would vanish with non-racial geographical zoning. The conditions in this
county present a classical case for this expedient."
391 U.S. at 441-42 n.6 (quoting Bowman v. County School Bd. of Charles City County,
382 F.2d 326, 332 n.3 (4th Cir. 1967) (en banc) (Sobeloff and Winter, JJ., concurring
specially)).
The Supreme Court also suggested the "pairing" of formerly all white and all black
schools, a remedy which Judge Sobeloff would have had the Fourth Circuit pursue in
Chambers v. Iredell County Bd. of Educ., 423 F.2d 613, 618 (4th Cir. 1970) (en banc)
(Sobeloff and Winter, JJ., dissenting).
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Education'57 dealing with the issue of school busing foreshadowed
the position taken by the Supreme Court. In Charlotte-
Mecklenburg, black and white housing patterns were rigidly seg-
regated. Therefore, considerable busing was necessary to disman-
tle the biracial school system, "root and branch." Disagreeing
with the Fourth Circuit's determination that the district court's
plan for massive busing at the elementary school level "is an
unreasonable burden," Judge Sobeloff would have affirmed the
plan in its entirety. "' A unanimous Supreme Court adopted, in
substance, the position taken by Judge Sobeloff.'59
In his final years, Judge Sobeloff did not merely treat the
mechanics of integration. He also contributed to the philosophy
of race relations. In this respect, his last two school decisions were
his most magnificent. These opinions demonstrate that, until his
death, Judge Sobeloff continued to grow intellectually and spirit-
ually and to enlarge his understanding of race relations in the
United States. Each of these opinions was a complete essay. The
first opinion addressed the politics and morality of racism'60 while
the second was more concerned with continuing the evolution of
legal standards for purging the "root and branch" of racism.','
Judge Sobeloff wrote a concurring opinion in the Clarendon
County case primarily in response to a partial dissent offered by
Judges Craven, Haynsworth and Bryan.1 2 The Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court order requiring the implementation of
a comprehensive desegregation plan. The dissenters, fearing
"white flight," would have modified the desegregation plan.' 3
Hence, they proposed that the case be remanded to the district
court with instructions to require the School Board to submit a
157. 431 F.2d 138, 148 (4th Cir. 1970) (en banc) (Sobeloff and Winter, JJ., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
158. Id. at 152. Accord, Brewer v. School Bd. of City of Norfolk, 434 F.2d 408, 413
(4th Cir.) (en banc) (Sobeloff and Winter, JJ., concurring specially), cert. denied, 499 U.S.
929 (1970).
159. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
160. Brunson v. Board of Trustees of School Dist. No. 1 of Clarendon County, 429
F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1970) (en banc) (Sobeloff, J., concurring).
161. 442 F.2d at 593, separate concurring and dissenting opinion of Sobeloff and
Winter, JJ., to United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 442 F.2d 575 (4th Cir.
1971) (en banc), rev'd, 407 U.S. 484 (1972), and Turner v. Littleton-Lake Gaston School
Dist., 442 F.2d 584 (4th Cir. 1971) (en banc).
162. Brunson v. Board of Trustees of School Dist. No. 1 of Clarendon County, 429
F.2d 820 (4th Cir. 1970) (en banc) (Craven, Haynsworth and Bryan, JJ., concurring and
dissenting).
163. 429 F.2d at 822. The dissent supported its fear of "white flight" by noting: "As
of September 1969, there were 2408 Black students and 256 white students enrolled in the
system .. " Id. at 821.
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pupil assignment plan that would allow most of the white stu-
dents to attend one high school and one elementary school.'64
Judge Sobeloff argued that the dissenters' position was not
only morally and constitutionally untenable, but "it offers a
premium for community resistance."'65 His opinion was also a
pointed essay on racism in the United States.'66 Few judges or
commentators since Justice Harlan dissented in the Civil Rights
Cases'7 and Plessy v. Ferguson'8 have written as effectively on
the subject. Judge Sobeloff correctly understood that:
The linch-pin of the dissent is the notion that, ideally, the
goal of desegregation should be to achieve an "optimal mix,"
consisting of a white majority. It suggests, as did Dr. Petti-
grew in his testimony in Brewer v. School Board of City of
Norfolk (4th Cir. 1970), that desegregation should not go so
far as to put whites in minority situations. In Brewer we gave
short shrift to the Board "principles" fashioned largely from
Dr. Pettigrew's testimony. Summary treatment is all it de-
served.'69
Understanding the dissenting opinion "to constitute a direct at-
tack on the roots of the Brown decision."'"6 Judge Sobeloff at-
tempted to correct the "profound misunderstanding of the social
and constitutional history of his nation and the Negro people,"' 7 '
by tracing the development of the law from Dred Scott v.
Sandford'72 to the present. He then expounded on his primary
point:
The invidious nature of the Pettigrew thesis, advanced by
the dissent in the present case, thus emerges. Its central
proposition is that the value of a school depends on the char-
acteristics of a majority of its students and superiority is
related to whiteness, inferiority to blackness. Although the
theory is couched in terms of "socio-economic class" and the
necessity for the creation of a "middle-class milieu," never-
theless, at bottom, it rests on the generalization that, educa-
164. Id. at 822.
165. Id. at 827.
166. Id. at 823.
167. 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883).
168. 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896).
169. Brunson v. Board of Trustees of School Dist. No. 1 of Clarendon County, 429
F.2d 820, 824 (4th Cir. 1970) (en banc) (Sobeloff, J., concurring).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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tionally speaking, white pupils are somehow better or more
desirable than black pupils. This premise leads to the next
proposition, that association with white pupils helps the
blacks and so long as whites predominate does not harm the
white children. But once the number of whites approaches
minority, then association with the inferior black children
hurts the whites and, because there are not enough of the
superior whites to go around, does not appreciably help the
blacks.
This idea, then, is no more than a resurrection of the
axiom of black inferiority as justification for separation of
the races, and no less than a return to the spirit of Dred
Scott. The inventors and proponents of this theory grossly
misapprehend the philosophical basis for desegregation. It is
not founded upon the concept that white children are a pre-
cious resource which should be fairly apportioned. It is not,
as Pettigrew suggests, because black children will be im-
proved by association with their betters. Certainly it is
hoped that under integration members of each race will
benefit from unfettered contact with their peers. But school
segregation is forbidden simply because its perpetuation is
a living insult to the black children and immeasurably
taints the education they receive. This is the precise lesson
of Brown. Were a court to adopt the Pettigrew rationale it
would do explicitly what compulsory segregation laws did
implicitly.,"
In his last school opinion, Judge Sobeloff treated the latest
stratagem of resistance to integration: "the carving out of new
school districts in order to achieve racial compositions more ac-
ceptable to the white community.""' Correctly anticipating the
view of a majority of the Supreme Court,' 5 he concluded that this
stratagem was merely another of the "evasive tactics pursued by
white communities to avoid the mandate of Brown . . . [that]
have ranged from outright nullification by means of massive re-
173. Brunson v. Board of Trustees of School Dist. No. 1 of Clarendon County, 429
F.2d 820, 826 (4th Cir. 1970) (en banc) Sobeloff, J., concurring).
174. 442 F.2d at 594, separate concurring and dissenting opinion of Sobeloff and
Winter, JJ., to United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 442 F.2d 575 (4th Cir.
1971) (en banc), rev'd, 407 U.S. 484 (1972), and Turner v. Littleton-Lake Gaston School
Dist., 442 F.2d 584 (4th Cir. 1971) (en banc).
175. Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); United States v. Scotland
Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972). But cf. Milliken v. Bradley, - U.S. -
(1974); Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 412 U.S. 92 (1973), af'g by an equally divided
Court, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972).
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sistance laws and by open and occasional violent defiance,
through discretionary pupil assignment laws and public tuition
grants in support of private segregated schools, to token integra-
tion plans parading under the banner of 'freedom-of-choice.' "I7
The majority of the Fourth Circuit, however, did not agree with
Judge Sobeloff that redistricting was necessarily a device for
avoiding school integration.
To insulate the school authorities from constitutional man-
date, Judge Sobeloff understood the Fourth Circuit to have estab-
lished a test whereby "District Courts are told to intercede only
if they find that racial considerations were the primary purpose
in the creation of the new school units."'' In dissent, he declared
that purpose is not the proper standard: "if challenged state ac-
tion has a racially discriminatory effect, it violates the equal pro-
tection clause unless a compelling and overriding legitimate state
interests is demonstrated."'' Not content to rely on the effect test
alone, he went on to demonstrate that, even applying a purpose
test, the defendants' actions were unconstitutional.'79 Implicitly
applying the tort standard that a person is "responsible for the
natural consequences of his actions,"' 80 Judge Sobeloff demon-
strated the unlawfully discriminatory inferences to be drawn from
the defendants' action. Once again, he had anticipated the Su-
preme Court as it moved to treat the difference between de facto
and de jure segregation. 8'
It is fitting to conclude this essay by quoting the very last
paragraph Judge Sobeloff published on the subject of public
school race relations law. Surely, it best summarizes his efforts
and the state of his development:
Racial peace and the good order and stability of our
society may depend more than some realize on a convincing
demonstration by our courts that true equality and nothing
less is precisely what we mean by our proclaimed ideal of
176. 442 F.2d at 593-94, separate concurring and dissenting opinion of Sobeloff and
Winter, JJ., to United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 442 F.2d 575 (4th Cir.
1971) (en banc), rev'd, 407 U.S. 484 (1972), and Turner v. Littleton-Lake Gaston School
Dist., 442 F.2d 584 (4th Cir. 1971) (en banc).
177. Id. at 594 (footnote omitted).
178. Id. at 595. Accord, Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1972).
179. 442 F.2d at 598-600, separate concurring and dissenting opinion of Sobeloff and
Winter, JJ., to United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 442 F.2d 575 (4th Cir.
1971) (en banc), rev'd, 407 U.S. 484 (1972), and Turner v. Littleton-Lake Gaston School
Dist., 442 F.2d 584 (4th Cir. 1971) (en banc).
180. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
181. See Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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"the equal protection of the laws." The palpable evasions
portrayed in this series of cases should be firmly condemned
and enjoined. Such examples of racial inequities do not go
unheeded by the adversely affected group. They are noted
and resented. The humiliations inflicted by such cynical
maneuvers feed the fires of hostility and aggravate the prob-
lem of maintaining peaceful race relations in the land. In this
connection it is timely to bear in mind the admonition of the
elder Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Plessy v. Ferguson.
"The destinies of the two races, in this country, are in-
dissolubly linked together, and the interests of both require
that the common government of all shall not permit the
seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction of law.' 1 82
182. 442 F.2d at 600-01, separate concurring and dissenting opinion of Sobeloff and
Winter, JJ., to United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 442 F.2d 575 (4th Cir.
1971) (en banc), rev'd, 407 U.S. 484 (1972), and Turner v. Littleton-Lake Gaston School
Dist., 442 F.2d 584 (4th Cir. 1971) (en banc).
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JUDGE SOBELOFF'S INFLUENCE UPON
CRIMINAL REFORM
ARNOLD M. WEINER*
Throughout his career, Simon Sobeloff demonstrated an
acute concern for improving the mechanism by which our society
deals witl criminal behavior. Perhaps, his leadership was most
strongly felt in the matters of appellate sentencing review and
criminal responsibility. His advocacy of reform in these areas
demonstrated his willingness to recognize inadequacies in the
criminal process, his ability to grasp and articulate the problems
and his sensitivity in reaching toward solutions.
SENTENCING REVIEW
In his frequent speeches devoted to sentencing review, Judge
Sobeloff exposed a critical flaw in our system of criminal justice.'
Although the law is "so solicitous of the defendant in safeguard-
ing his rights at every stage of the trial," he observed, it "leaves
him almost completely without protection when he stands before
the judge to be sentenced." ' For the nine out of ten defendants
who plead guilty, punishment is the only issue in their cases, and
yet the law reposes "in a single judge the sole responsibility for
this vital function."' 3 Judge Sobeloff noted that statistics and case
studies "constantly remind us of shocking abuses and irrational
disparities."4 Unfortunately, experience teaches that "[a]s long
as virtually unrestricted discretion is vested in sentencing judges,
there will be ample room for grossly-mistaken, arbitrary and
emotionally-dictated judgments."I On the other side of the coin,
*B.A., 1955; LL.B., 1957, University of Maryland; Law Clerk to Judge Sobeloff, 1957-
58; Partner, Melnicove, Greenberg, Kaufman, & Weiner, P.A., Baltimore, Maryland.
1. See, e.g., Sobeloff, Appellate Review of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 249, 264 (1962)
(address before the Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit); Sobeloff, Federalism and
Individual Liberties-Can We Have Both?, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 296, 305 (lecture at the
Washington University School of Law) [hereinafter cited as Federalism and Individual
Liberties]; Sobeloff, Parole Is Here to Stay, 18 FED. PROBATION 6, 7 (1954) (address before
the Mid-Atlantic Probation and Parole Conference); Sobeloff, A Recommendation for
Appellate Review of Criminal Sentences, 21 BROOKLYN L. REv. 2 (1955); Sobeloff, The
Sentence of the Court: Should There Be Appellate Review?, 41 A.B.A.J. 13 (1955) (address
before the Section of Criminal Law) [hereinafter cited as The Sentence of the Court];
Sobeloff, Should There Be Appellate Review of Sentences? (unpublished address before
the Judicial Conference of the Third Circuit, 1963) [hereinafter cited as Appellate Review
of Sentences].
2. The Sentence of the Court, supra note 1, at 13.
3. Appellate Review of Sentences, supra note 1, at 2.
4. Id. at 3.
5. Id. at 6.
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he added, misuse of the sentencing power sometimes results in
"grossly inadequate sentences." ' At either extreme, Judge Sobel-
off believed, "fantastic vagaries tear down the mightiest sanction
of the law-respect for the courts."'
The federal judiciary, the Judge observed, although acutely
aware of the problem, has resorted only to inadequate steps to-
ward solution. Periodic sentencing institutes, convened infre-
quently for the exchange of views on sentencing policy, and the
use of sentencing panels in a handful of districts do little to rem-
edy the overall problem Judge Sobeloff was of the opinion that
such voluntary sessions "will have but slight impact on extreme
disparities caused by some judges who will respond to nothing
less than directions on appeal." 9 The "basic concept of checks
and balances," he declared, "should apply to men's destinies as
well as to procedural matters."'" The appellate courts are suited
to the task, he reasoned, because they are removed from the
''emotional overtones of the trial" and because of their wider
perspective." As in review of other matters involving judicial dis-
cretion, the appellate court would have the benefit of the trial
judge's reasons and the source materials, including presentence
reports, on which the lower court had acted. Judge Sobeloff pro-
posed that the appellate court have the authority to increase the
sentence as well as to diminish it. 2 The Judge believed that the
possibility of such review would have a "sobering and moderating
effect.' 3 He shrewdly observed: "The existence of the power
would make its exercise unnecessary in all but a few cases."'" The
authority to review sentences, moreover, could be expected to
lessen those appeals which recite legal bases but which are only
"anguished protests against excessive punishment."' 5
In his decisions, when the issue was presented directly as in
United States v. Martell,' Judge Sobeloff declared that the court
was without authority to review a sentence imposed within statu-
tory limits. On occasion, however, he did reach out to provide
6. The Sentence of the Court, supra note 1, at 16.
7. Id.
8. Appellate Review of Sentences, supra note 1, at 11-12.
9. Id. at 12-13.
10. Id. at 9.
11. The Sentence of the Court, supra note 1, at 17.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Federalism and Individual Liberties, supra note 1, at 305.
16. 335 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1964).
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relief from a particularly shocking disposition. In United States
v. Jenkins," for example, a two year sentence had been imposed
upon a defendant who had attempted forgery pursuant to a plan
"so preposterous and so manifestly destined to failure that no
reasonable mind should expect it to deceive anyone."' 8 The
Fourth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Sobeloff, vacated the
sentence sua sponte and remanded the case for inquiry "into the
defendant's mental condition at the time of his offense."' 9 The
district judge ordered a mental examination and thereafter sus-
pended all but six months of the sentence.'" Similarly, in United
States v. Hawthorne," a small-time gambler, who had been con-
victed on two gambling charges and who had irritated the trial
judge, was given concurrent five year sentences. The court, al-
though it affirmed one of the convictions, remanded the case so
that "the judge may reconsider the sentence" in light of the par-
tial reversal. 2 The district judge, stating that he was "heeding the
hint . . . or suggestion of the Court of Appeals," reduced the
sentence to two years.2 1
The prodding of the appellate court, without a firm legal
foundation, was not always so successful. In United States v.
Wilson,24 a young man, with no previous record, pleaded guilty
to forgery of a small check. In the two years between his arrest
and the disposition of his case, he maintained a steady job and
led an exemplary life. Although the probation officer, after pre-
sentence investigation, recommended probation, the district
judge sentenced the defendant to three years imprisonment.
Judge Sobeloff expressed the court's "sense of perplexity and
concern" over the severity of the sentence, observing that "the
disparity between the crime and the punishment is baffling."25
Despite the rule that it is not an appellate court's function to
review sentences, he declared, the case would be remanded for
17. 347 F.2d 345 (4th Cir. 1965).
18. Id. at 348.
19. Id.
20. United States v. Jenkins, Cr. No. 4078 (E.D. Va., orders entered July 29, 1965,
and Sept. 28, 1965).
21. 356 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1966).
22. Id. at 742.
23. United States v. Hawthorne, Cr. No. 10664 (S.D. W. Va. 1966), Record at 9-10.
At the resentencing, the district judge also said that he was acting in spite of "my irrita-
tion with my brethren on the Court of Appeals" and "the irritations that this man placed
on the Court from time to time." Id., Record at 7-8. The reduced sentence was affirmed
in a second appeal. United States v. Hawthorne, 370 F.2d 330 (4th Cir. 1966).
24. 450 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1971).
25. Id. at 498.
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reconsideration because "the sentence here may have been the
product of sheer inadvertence" and not "a deliberate exercise of
judicial discretion."" The district judge, refusing to relent,
promptly resentenced the defendant to another three year term.2
A second appeal yielded only a per curiam affirmance.2 1
In spite of a growing number of proponents,29 the federal
system still remains without any mechanism for sentence review.
Judge Marvin Frankel of the Southern District of New York re-
ports that sentencing institutes are infrequent and brief and:
"For the most part, the judges tend to record their differences,
reassure each other of their independence and go home to do their
disparate thing as before." 0 Sentencing panels or councils have
been utilized by only a handful of districts. 1 Although the Ninth
Circuit, in a 1964 sentencing institute, adopted a resolution call-
ing for the creation of such panels, Judge Frankel reports that no
district court within the circuit has followed the resolution. 31
Opponents of sentencing review, not all of them district judges,
remain vocal.3
26. Id.
27. United States v. Wilson, Cr. No. 168-70-N (E.D. Va., order entered Nov. 23,
1971).
28. United States v. Wilson, No. 71-1318 (4th Cir., filed May 17, 1972).
29. In 1968, the American Bar Association adopted standards, prepared by an advi-
sory committee chaired by Judge Sobeloff, relating to appellate review of sentences. ABA
PROJECr ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE
REVIEW OF SENTENCES (1968). The standards provide that sentence review be available in
all cases where provision is made for review of the conviction, id. Standard 1.1 (a), at 13,
and that the conviction and sentence be reviewed by the same court as part of the direct
appeal, id. Standard 2.1, at 31. The record on appeal, the standards suggest, should
include a full record of the sentencing procedure, copies of presentence and diagnostic
reports, and such parts of the trial record as are relevant to the sentencing decision. Id.
Standard 2.3, at 42. The appellate court is required to make its own examination of the
record and to set forth the basis for its disposition in a written opinion. Id. Standard 3.1,
at 48. Contrary to the earlier Sobeloff proposals, as the consequence of a close vote, the
standards provide that the appellate court shall not be empowered to increase sentences
on review. Id. Standard 3.4, at 55; see Commentary 55-66.
30. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 20 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Frankel]; cf. Institute on Sentencing for the United States District Judges, 35
F.R.D. 381 (1964); Seminar and Institute on Disparity of Sentences for Sixth, Seventh and
Eighth Judicial Circuits, 30 F.R.D. 401 (1961); Sentencing Institute and Joint Council for
the Fifth Judicial Circuit, 30 F.R.D. 185 (1961); Sentencing Institute, Circuit Conference
of the Ninth Judicial Circuit, 27 F.R.D. 287 (1960).
31. Frankel, supra note 30, at 20.
32. Id. at 21.
33. See, e.g., Brewster, Appellate Review of Sentences, 40 F.R.D. 79 (1967). The
Judicial Conferences of the Fifth and Ninth Judicial Circuits, in 1964 and 1965, voted
against appellate review of sentences. Id. at 81.
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CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY-
The issue of criminal responsibility drew Judge Sobeloffs
early attention. In 1955, while Solicitor General, he addressed the
National Conference of Bar Councils on the subject. 4 Durham v.
United States 5 had just recently been decided, and the American
Law Institute was considering various proposed formulations for
criminal responsibility. Sensible reform, Judge Sobeloff under-
stood, involved a careful blend of philosophical and psychological
considerations. He accepted the traditional assumption of the
criminal law that men act in accordance with free will; that those
who exercise their will to transgress the law are to be punished;
but that "there are conditions, recognized as disease or defect,
which in good morals should excuse the afflicted one from crimi-
nal responsibility. 3
With remarkable foresight, Judge Sobeloff cautioned against
excessive preoccupation "with the minutiae" of the differences
between the new formulations, emphasizing that they "reveal a
greater degree of accord than of actual disharmony. 37 The de-
mise of the McNaghten rule,38 and the substitution of any of the
new formulations, would operate to permit a full inquiry into the
question of volition as well as that of cognition. More impor-
tantly, a reformulation would permit the courts to free them-
selves from the stinted procedures by which expert testimony was
received only in conclusory form and in the language of the legal
test. The Judge observed that each of the proposed formulations
"allows the jury to receive more light" and encourages testimony
''cast in terms that are meaningful to the witness and that can
be more amply explained. 319 The suggested changes, moreover,
34. This speech was subsequently published as an article. Sobeloff, From McNagh-
ten to Durham, and Beyond-A Discussion of Insanity and the Criminal Law, 15 Md. L.
Rev. 93 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Insanity and the Criminal Law].
35. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
36. Insanity and the Criminal Law, supra note 34, at 105. The free will assumption,
which Judge Sobeloff accepted on moral and philosophical grounds, is challenged by those
who would severely limit or abolish the insanity defense. Their arguments, proceeding
from a deterministic concept of human behavior, are premised largely, if not exclusively,
on psychological assumptions. See Diamond, Criminal Responsibility of the Addict: Con-
viction by Force of Habit, 1 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 395 (1973); Goldstein & Katz, Abolish
the "Insanity Defense"-Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853 (1963); Kittrie, Responsibility and
the Therapeutic State, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 873 (1973); Lyons, Unobvious Excuses in'the
Criminal Law, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 925 (1973); Monahan, Abolish the Insanity De-
fense?-Not Yet, 26 RUTGERs L. REv. 719 (1973); Rose, Criminal Responsibility and Com-
petency as Influenced by Organic Disease, 35 Mo. L. Rav. 326 (1970).
37. Insanity and the Criminal Law, supra note 34, at 105.
38. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
39. Insanity and the Criminal Law, supra note 34, at 107.
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are intended to provide a "means . . . to bring the legal and
medical professions together."40
In a characteristic display of pragmatism Judge Sobeloff rec-
ognized that the changes would neither "spell ruin to law enforce-
ment" nor "bring salvation."4' To those who argued for the com-
plete abolition of the insanity defense, with their particular com-
plaint against the consideration of scientific evidence by un-
trained juries, he replied that the continued role of juries is "not
an unmixed calamity."42 He reminded them that, "[jiuries often
find ways, sometimes with the benign acquiescence of judges, to
mitigate rigidities and absurdities in the law" and that juries
"tend to reflect the community sense of justice which courts can-
not wholly ignore in maintaining public order."4 It was not in-
tended, he added, that greater sensitivity in assessing responsibil-
ity be at the expense of society's need to protect itself. Those
acquitted by reason of insanity "should be put in detention and
should remain there as long as necessary."44 The Judge argued
that a "warden's certificate that the prisoner has served his sen-
tence and been discharged regardless of his medical condition"
offers less protection than "detention and treatment in a hospital,
and ultimately a medical judgment that the person is not likely
to offend again."45
The decisions of the Fourth Circuit bear the heavy imprint
of the views expressed by Judge Sobeloff. In a series of opinions,
beginning in 1961 with Hall v. United States," Judge Sobeloff
emphasized the role of the jury as arbiter of the responsibility
issue, declaring that only "slight" evidence, not even "such as to
generate a reasonable doubt," was sufficient to overcome the pre-
40. Id. at 109. The urgent need for further efforts in this direction is the subject of
considerable scholarly concern. See, e.g., H. FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL
INSANITY (1972) [hereinafter cited as FINGAmrTE]; S. HALLECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE DI-
LEMMAS OF CRIME (1967); K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT (1968); H. PACKER,
THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968). Fingarette suggests, optimistically, that
"psychiatric understanding" was "the mental concepts of common sense and the law";
that "the contemporary psychiatrist is also deeply concerned with questions of moral
values and moral judgments"; and that "moral concepts and issues are as central to
psychiatric doctrine and practice as are teleological concepts of wish and purpose."
FINGARETrE 98.
41. Insanity and the Criminal Law, supra note 34, at 108.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 105.
45. Id. at 109.
46. 295 F.2d 26, 28 (4th Cir. 1961); see Jacobs v. United States, 350 F.2d 571 (4th
Cir. 1966); United States v. Taylor, 437 F.2d 371, 379 (4th Cir. 1971) (Sobeloff, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part); cf. Kilbert v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1967).
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sumption of sanity and to send the question to the factfinder.
Without direct reference to any applicable standard, he dis-
cussed, in the Hall opinion, the need for the jury to consider
diffuse expert testimony with respect to the defendant's intellec-
tual and emotional development and as to any condition which
might impair his judgment, insight or controls.
When, in 1968, the Fourth Circuit approved the American
Law Institute "substantial capacity" test in United States v.
Chandler,7 the Sobeloff influence was apparent. Judge
Haynsworth, in an opinion in which Judge Sobeloff joined, cau-
tioned: "We avoided the imposition of rigid formulas in Hall, and
we prescribe none now."48 Although "[w]e embrace today's ad-
vances," Judge Haynsworth added, "[w]e abjure any formalistic
approach which might foreclose variation."49 More significant
than the details of the formulation, the opinion continued, was
the requirement that the insanity issue, when raised, be fully
explored. Henceforth, the opinion noted, the courts must conduct
"an unrestricted inquiry into the whole personality of a defendant
who surmounts the threshold question of doubt of his responsibil-
ity. 5
0
Two cases decided shortly after Chandler illustrate the care
with which Judge Sobeloff sought to implement the new doctrine.
In United States v. Wilson,5 Judge Sobeloff condemned the trial
in which a perfunctory psychiatric examination had been fol-
lowed by a cursory presentation in court. He stressed the duty of
defense counsel and experts to engage "in significant consultation
prior to trial"; the "obligation" of the psychiatrist "to present the
jury with the underlying data"; and the requirement that counsel
conduct a searching inquiry of each expert.52 "The need for judi-
cial supervision is particularly urgent in insanity cases . . . ." he
continued, and the trial judge has an affirmative duty to ensure
that there is adequate "exploration of the underlying, determina-
tive facts."53 Judge Sobeloff concluded that the years of "intense
search" for an improved standard will not have brought about a
material advance if appellate courts "tolerate. .. failure to focus
on the basic facts indispensable for. . . significant judgment" or
47. 393 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1968).
48. Id. at 927.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 926.
51. 399 F.2d 459, 464 (4th Cir. 1968) (Sobeloff, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 464.
53. Id. at 465.
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if "shallow and mechanical. . performance. . . is validated. 5 4
In the second case, United States v.. Butler," the insanity
issue was explored exhaustively in the testimony, but the district
judge, in his instructions, departed somewhat from the American
Law Institute formulation. Holding that the conviction should
not be reversed, Judge Sobeloff declined to permit the court to
become immersed in the nuances of insanity instructions. The
"whole tenor" of the recent advances, he wrote, was "to discour-
age a formalistic straitjacket in the examination of the witnesses
and the instructions to the juries. 56 If the trial is liberated from
"the unnatural restraints" previously imposed, and if an instruc-
tion contains adequate description of the cognitive and volitional
elements of legal insanity, the Judge concluded, the judgment
will not be disturbed.2
Thus, the Fourth Circuit, rather than adhere to legal formal-
ism, has developed a workable test for criminal responsibility. 5
The new standard strongly reflects Judge Sobeloff's belief that
the essence of reform is in the practice to be adopted and not in
the language of the formulation.
CONCLUSION
Judge Sobeloff's work was directed toward the greater goal
of improvement of our system of criminal justice. As he fre-
quently reminded us, the entire system suffers when unfair proce-
dures are slavishly and mindlessly perpetuated. Sensible reform
benefits our entire society and not just the accused. In the best
tradition of our empirical legal method, Judge Sobeloff did not
54. Id. at 466. Although the trial had taken place before Chandler, Judge Sobeloff
argued that this case be reversed for the lesson which it might afford. The two-member
majority of the panel voted for affirmance, noting, however, that the Sobeloff views accur-
ately reflected the procedure to be followed under the new standard and that, had the trial
occurred after Chandler, the conviction would have been reversed. Id. at 462.
55. 409 F.2d 1261 (4th Cir. 1969).
56. Id. at 1262.
57. Professor Weihofen has criticized Butler, stating that by this decision: "The
Fourth Circuit . . . seems to regard the ALI test as only making a cosmetic change."
Weihofen, Detruding the Experts, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 38, 45 n.28.
58. Other federal circuits have embraced the ALI rule with varying degrees of flexi-
bility and alertness to the procedural dangers. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d
969 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. White, 447 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Stewart, 443 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir.
1971); United States v. Smith, 437 F.2d 538 (6th Cir. 1970); United States v. O'Neal, 431
F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Tarrago, 398 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1968); Pope v.
United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967); United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d
Cir. 1961).
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hesitate to declare that, while correct rulings deserved to be pre-
cedents and should be followed, those rulings or procedures
which, through experience, have proven unsatisfactory, must be
changed.
